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Abstract
The global financial crisis came as a surprise for many economists, governments and populations 
around the world. Most economists relied on models of how the economy functions which did not 
have the capability to produce or predict breakdowns and crises, because long term stability was 
taken for granted and short term deviations were expected to largely resolve themselves by the 
normal functioning of free markets. However, other economists have developed theories and 
models which predict that excessive economic fluctuations with the potential for breakdowns can 
occur. This thesis describes and contrasts two of these theories and their associated models; the 
Financial Instability Hypothesis developed by Hyman Minsky, and later modeled by Steve Keen, 
and the Leverage Cycle developed by John Geanakoplos. What becomes evident from their 
analyses is that conditions in financial markets can have a significant impact on the real economy. 
On this background it is argued that individuals, firms and nations under certain conditions are 
intrinsically motivated to incur a level of debt, which is sustainable under the tranquil economic 
conditions that prevailed when it was undertaken, but leaves them vulnerable and sensitive to 
unexpected negative shocks. 
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 1 Introduction
When the financial crisis hit the global economy in 2007, it was to the great surprise of the general 
public and the vast majority of economists. Most media outlets portrayed it as though there were no 
theories which could describe or predict the calamity which unfolded. There are indeed such 
theories and models, however they have been given little attention beyond narrow academic circles 
until now. This thesis explores two of these theories and their differences to the mainstream models 
then compares their policy recommendations with the actual policy responses to the financial crisis 
in some selected countries.
It has been understood since Sismondi (1829) that the economy moves between periods of 
increasing and decreasing growth and it has been the central theme of economic debates throughout 
the centuries why this occurs and how to best deal with it. One of the main purposes of 
macroeconomics is to understand the forces and connections which give rise to economic 
fluctuations and propose policies which reduce them and the problems which arise as a 
consequence. The existence and costs of fluctuations in economic activity are well known and 
uncontroversial. A boom (extraordinary growth) period being problematic might seem paradoxical, 
as we generally think that growth is good. Even so, if the growth rate is unsustainable, there is 
likely to be a costly recession later. In booms there will be investment in production facilities and 
training of personnel for which there is insufficient demand in later periods. The dismantling and 
retraining which follows involves losses for the individuals and the society as a whole. Booms also 
involve price inflation as both inputs and outputs for goods and services are in high demand, 
pushing their prices up. Recessions, on the other hand, are characterized by low investment and 
high unemployment which suppresses demand and lowers activity further. 
Although the existence of economic fluctuations and/or cycles are uncontroversial, there is a vivid 
debate about why they occur and in turn how to deal with them. The mainstream explanation for 
fluctuations comes from Keynesian economics, where the short run discrepancies between supply 
and demand leads to periods of insufficient supply (incentivizing expansion) and excess supply 
(motivating contraction of production). The problem reinforces itself particularly in a contraction 
because when firms lay off workers to reduce production, the unemployed workers can no longer 
purchase as many goods, causing a further fall in demand. The standard policy response to this 
problem is to curtail investments in expansionary periods by having the central bank increase 
interest rates and suppress demand by running government fiscal surpluses. Conversely, in a 
depression the central bank will encourage investment by lowering the interest rate and the 
government will run deficits to increase demand.
The reason why economists were surprised was that they believed that the modern tools of counter-
cyclical policies for managing fluctuations were so effective that the possibility of bubbles and 
crashes negligible. In the first years of the new millennium, several leading economists argued that 
the preceding twenty years of unusually low macroeconomic volatility was evidence that the 
prevailing system of fiscal and monetary intervention used to stabilise economy had successfully 
brought fluctuations under control (Stock & Watson, 2002; Lucas, 2003; Bernanke, 2004). 
 1.1 The role of credit
The role of credit as a contributor to fluctuations in the economy has been largely discounted as 
unimportant because it was viewed that debt only redistributes wealth from one agent to another 
without having significant macroeconomic effects (Bernanke 1995). The current crises in the U.S. 
and Europe has forced economists to reconsider the role of credit because their roots are in precisely 
inflated debt levels; in the U.S. through an incredible inflation in mortgage loans and derivative 
trading in them - in Europe there was government debt with no collateral. In light of the recent 
crises, a better understanding of the role of debt in the evolution of the economy is needed.
In classic macroeconomic theory money is neutral. Agents' priorities do not change based on the 
number of coins they have, only how many goods they can buy with those coins. If there is twice 
the number of coins, but the same amount of goods and services which can be bought in the 
economy, we should expect a doubling of prices. Most economists agree that this must be the case 
in the long term, but there are different schools of thought on whether money affects the economy 
in the short run, which are discussed in detail in the literature review section.
In modern economic systems, there are two channels through which the supply of money (M2) 
increases: The first is when it is simply manufactured by the central bank and the other is through 
lending in the fractional reserve banking system. There are differences in the two conceptually, but 
for the end user of funds, they are indistinguishable. The most important difference is that the 
money created by the central bank is fixed by a single authority, while the money generated through 
the banking system varies with market conditions. When banks lend out money, they are not 
actually creating additional money, but are in fact lending out someone else's savings. The creation 
of money by banks is a temporary change to the money supply. Lending increases the money supply 
at the time of issue and repayment reduces it at a future time. After the loan is fully repaid, the 
money supply is back where it started, et ceteri paribus. This is rare the case, however, as new loans 
are continuously issued and old ones repaid. The net change to the money supply from the banking 
sector is thus the aggregated difference between new loans and repayment of old ones. 
Along with moving money through time, the borrower is also moving their consumption or 
investment through time. An increase at the time the funds is borrowed entails a reduction in a 
future as some income must be set aside for interest and principal. As mentioned, when credit 
expands from loans, this is not new money, but making use of other agents' savings. Thus, there is 
not more money chasing goods. What really occurs is that the borrower increases the demand for 
some goods, because he is no longer bound by the credit constraint which prevented him from 
spending the way he desired. There is not an equivalent reduction in demand from the lender. 
Hence, the equilibrium price should increase, all else being equal.
The correlation between credit expansion/contraction and the business cycle is argued and 
empirically tested by Borio and Löwe (2004). They found that an excessive expansion in credit 
which is accompanied by an asset price bubble is a good indicator leading fluctuations in output. 
Further, they found that traditional monetary policy which targets inflation with a short time horizon 
will not optimally counteract the resulting economic cycles.
 1.2 The financial instability hypothesis and the leverage cycle
This thesis explores two of the theories which are starting to gain momentum in academic circles to 
capture the possibility of economic cycles endogenously caused or amplified, in part, by interaction 
between the real economy and credit markets. In particular it will focus on a model by Steve Keen 
(1995), based on Minsky's financial instability hypothesis (1977) and on the leverage cycle 
developed by John Geanakoplos (2003; 2010). 
A striking aspect of these two models is that they explain the phenomenon of economic cycles, with 
an astounding number of similarities in argumentation and dynamics. Both argue for heterogeneity 
among investors, causing asset prices to be bid upward by optimistic investors, at high leverage. It 
is argued that credit conditions are loosened over time when markets exhibit low volatility or 
trending good returns, allowing optimistic investors to take on additional leverage. High leverage 
eventually makes positions so volatile to unexpected shocks that when a negative turn comes, the 
results are catastrophic for some agents leading to fire sales which drives prices further down and 
creates a landslide of sales and prices.
That the two models have a number of similarities would not be particularly surprising if it was not 
for the fact that they are developed independently, from completely different theoretical 
backgrounds and employing very dissimilar sets of modeling tools. On the one hand, the financial 
instability hypothesis is argued as a heterodox interpretation of Keynes works (1936; 1937) 
focusing on elements which the neo-classical synthesis did not. Keen takes his cue from Minsky, 
who argued that it was primarily the unwillingness or inability of investors to consider profitability 
over longer time periods which leads to "euphoric" periods because agents extrapolate current rising 
trends in asset prices, but also the irreducible uncertainty of future asset prices which investors face 
and an endogenous nature of money with real impacts on economic activity.  The model traces its 
roots to Goodwin's growth cycle (1956), using the dynamic modeling employed by Lotka (1925) 
and Volterra (1926) in order to describe predator and prey systems.  On the other hand, the leverage 
cycle argues a very similar sequence of developments through the introduction of collateral as a key 
factor in the determination of equilibrium in credit contracts. When markets are less volatile, 
lenders will allow more leverage, as the probability of default is lower. With higher leverage, the 
most optimistic buyers can hold a larger proportion of the assets and will bid up the prices of assets. 
The tools used to model the leverage cycle are taken from game theory and finance with 
simultaneous clearing of all markets.
 1.3 Positive feedback
A main point where the financial instability hypothesis differs from traditional economics is in that 
it allows at least parts of the economy to be governed by positive feedback as opposed to the 
diminishing or dampening dynamics of equilibrium based models. Positive feedback means that a 
system will serve to reinforce the effect of an initial shock. For example, we may argue that 
investment leads to high employment, higher incomes and higher demand, which in turn motivates 
further investment to meet the increased demand. 
In finance, the prevailing explanation of prices for the last six decades argues that markets are 
efficient in determining prices. Excessively optimistic or pessimistic investors will be punished by 
paying too much or selling too cheap, respectively. Markets will reward the rational investors 
eventually when assets deliver their actual fundamental value. If prices diverge from fundamental 
value, then there are arbitrage opportunities which rational investors will eliminate by trading in the 
asset -- buying underpriced assets and selling overpriced ones thus returning prices to their 
fundamental value through the forces of supply and demand (Fama, 1970). On the other hand, if the 
economy is subject to positive feedback, the equilibrium is not stable; if certain variables are 
displaced sufficiently in the short run, the economy will not necessarily return to equilibrium, but 
might well propel itself further away. Delong et. al. (1990) pointed out, that speculators who chase a 
trend for short-term gains, buying when markets are rising and selling when they are falling, will 
reinforce the initial trend. This is in reality a pyramid or Ponzi type logic which cannot persist 
indefinitely. Still, in the short run it is rational for an investor to "jump on the bandwagon" while the 
trend persists.  
For example, when housing prices are rising, some investors (and lenders!) might extrapolate the 
trend and include further increases in their estimated ability to repay the loan. If they do, they will 
conclude that there is a near zero probability of incurring losses even in the case of a default on 
interest and principle payments as the value of the house will be sufficient to settle the debt and 
consequently lenders will allow borrowing with a very small proportion of the borrowers own 
capital as collateral (the margin). Neither borrower nor lender have a problem with taking/extending 
a loan at say 5% interest, if the price of the house is expected to increase by 10% per year, because 
even if the borrower cannot repay the loan in cash he can sell the house which is expected to be 
worth sufficient to settle the debt, including interest. The result of the rising housing prices is thus a 
further increase in demand and prices because more loans can be issued against the collateral, 
reinforcing the initial movement. This type of investment strategy is rational in the short-run 
(buying and selling on a upward trend), but obviously prices cannot keep rising at astronomical 
rates forever, so eventually someone will have to take the losses when prices eventually flatten out 
or start falling.
Other examples of positive feedback can be found in microeconomics. Brian Arthur (1989) 
explained that especially high-tech industries which require heavy investment in R&D and service 
industries which rely on reputation and experience are characterized by increasing returns which 
causes increased market share and vice versa. E.g. once the Windows operative systems attained a 
certain amount of popularity, it became the standard for subsequent products gained further market 
share and feeding back into more people using their system. Once the company departs from the 
equilibrium market share, rather than return to it, the advantage they gain reinforces their chances of 
conquering additional share. 
In the setting of the financial instability hypothesis, a period of prudent investment strategies causes 
most investments to be successful and the leveraged ones to be rewarded the most. This causes 
some overconfidence which leads to increasingly leveraged investment levels which in turn inflates 
asset prices, validating such leveraged investments and encouraging more of it. The positive 
feedback between increasing leverage and prices produces a boom phase in the economic cycle and 
also amplifies the speed and severity of the subsequent collapse. When prices are falling fewer 
agents are willing to invest, reducing demand and prices even further. 
The leverage cycle does not describe positive feedback explicitly, because it is focused on the price 
determination in equilibrium rather than describing the economy in a continuous dynamic model. 
According to the theory, the financial dimension causes the economy to endogenously produce 
excessively leveraged positions, which will default in the case of a negative shock. Thus a shock 
will be amplified by the amount of leverage incurred by the agents, but it will not feed back into the 
economy repeatedly in this model. However, positive feedback is an immediate consequence of the 
pricing mechanism it describes, because when wealth is redistributed toward the agents who 
correctly predict future price movements, it will increase their purchasing power and cause their 
valuation to weigh heavier in subsequent periods. E.g. when prices move upward (from unexpected 
good news), the optimistic investors are rewarded and allow them to purchase more assets, bidding 
up prices further, validating optimistic expectations.
The next section outlines the literature relevant to the thesis, traces the evolution of the central ideas 
toward their current expressions and places the topic within a bigger picture of economic debates. 
Section three and four outlines the theory and modeling of the financial instability hypothesis (FIH) 
and the leverage cycle (LC), respectively. Section five compares and contrasts the two theories. 
Section six provides some evidence for why these models are now relevant and discusses whether 
actual policy is consistent with the policy recommendations provided by the FIH and the LC.
 2 Literature review
 2.1 Business cycles and schools of thought in macroeconomics
"We find [that the state of trade is] subject to various conditions which are periodically
returning: it revolves apparently in an established cycle. First we find it i.n
a state of quiescence, — next improvement, — growing confidence, — prosperity,
— excitement, — overtrading, — convulsion, — pressure. — stagnation, —
distress, — ending again in quiescence." (Lord Overstone 1857, p. 44)
The phenomenon of economic fluctuations and cycles has been observed for presumably as long as 
there has been trade, but the concept has only attracted scientific scrutiny in the last two centuries. 
Jean Sismondi (1819) is credited with the first theories explaining economic crises which appeared 
periodically. He focused on the disconnection between production and demand as the main forces 
causing periods of excess supply (crises) and others of excess demand (booms). Clement Juglar 
(1862) showed empirically that production and prices rose during expansion phases and fell in 
recessions. Schumpeter (1929) identified the four stages of a cycle as expansion, crisis, recession 
and recovery. He then imagined that the economy were subject to several overlapping cycles of 
different lengths, named after their discoverers; Kitchin, Juglar and Kontratieff (Zarnowitz, 1991).
While few contest the historically observed variations in economic output, which the National 
Bureau of Economic Research has identified as 33 business cycles (NBER 2012), there is a vivid 
debate about why they occur, their characteristics and what policies the society can undertake to 
minimize them and their associated costs. Because the problem of business cycles goes to the heart 
of our very understanding of how the economy operates on the macroeconomic level, there are as 
many theories of the business cycle as there are schools of economic thought and each prescribes a 
different set of policies to remedy them.
 2.1.1  Classical
In the first half of the 19th century, mainstream economists subscribed to the classical view which 
draws on the works of Adam Smith (1776), Jean-Baptiste Say (1803), David Ricardo (1817) and 
Thomas Malthus (1798). This view explains economics through the decision making of the 
individual agent or firm as optimizers according to the conditions they find themselves in. Investors 
will allocate capital to where they believe they will receive the greatest return. This will cause 
assets to be priced fairly by the competitive market as mispriced assets will quickly be bought or 
sold by opportunistic investors.  Fluctuations in the economy are thus not predictable cycles, but 
simply the adjustment agents make to capture better opportunities as they are discovered. There is 
then no need for the government to intervene, as competitive markets are already allocating 
resources efficiently. 
In the second half of the 19th century, the classical view was modified to incorporate the insights of 
William Jevons, Carl Menger, Leon Walras and Alfred Marshall who distinguished between the cost 
of production and utility in consumption when determining the price and value of a product. This 
view entails that producers cannot always accurately predict what demand will be in the future, but 
will still adjust over time to capture changing demand.
In the early 20th century, the classical view lost popularity with the advent of the Keynesian 
revolution in economics. Nevertheless, following the stagflation of the 1970s, when Keynesian 
ideas were discarded by many economists, classical ideas were brought back and reworked by, 
amongst others, John Muth (1961) and Robert Lucas (1976) into what is now known as new 
classical economics. This school of thought emphasizes the rational expectations of individual 
agents and flexible prices to ensure that all markets will clear (Barro, 1989). All agents act to 
maximize utility given the information available to them given. If at any time, the supply and the 
demand of goods are not aligned, wages and prices must adjust to restore equilibrium. A popular 
explanation of economic fluctuations presented in the new classical framework is the "real business 
cycle" (Kydland & Prescott 1982), which states that the fluctuations we see are in fact the rational 
responses of individuals and firms to continuous shocks in market conditions, technology and 
information. 
In classical economics the disequilibrium caused by shocks are quickly absorbed. This is also the 
case for shifts in the supply of money. It is argued that prices will adjust swiftly to restore the real 
value of money (money supply divided by price level) to previous levels. The result is that money is 
neutral in this theory: unable to affect the output of the real economy.
 2.1.2  Keynesian
Keynesian economics describe a different scenario underlying business cycles. Keynes emphasized 
that under certain conditions the market would not automatically restore equilibrium. Particularly, if 
the demand for money is in the low end of the scale where interest rates are not responsive to 
changes in output and further spending is lower than required for full employment of resources, 
then price and wage reductions will not restore supply-demand equilibrium (Heijdra & Van der 
Ploeg 2002, pp. 19-21). Following this line of reasoning, when markets operate with less than full 
employment, the government can stimulate the economy by demanding goods and services. 
Samuelson (1939) applied the Keynesian framework to produce oscillations as a result of an initial 
shock to output, and Goodwin (1967) showed how the interplay between wages and employment 
can produce repeated economic cycles without dampening.
In Keynesian economics, prices adjust slowly as opposed to classical economics where they adjust 
quickly. The consequence is that supply and demand shocks are not absorbed immediately, but have 
real effects on the economy in the short run. This is an important distinction because it means that it 
is possible for governments to enact policies which will have a real effect on the economy in the 
short run. For example, in a recession the government can increase spending to raise demand to 
normal levels or the central bank might increase the money supply to lower interest rates and 
encourage spending/investments.
 2.1.3  Monetarism
Monetarism as developed, amongst others, by Milton Friedman (1963; 1983) argues that inflation is 
solely a monetary phenomenon and fluctuations in the economy result when the change in output 
differs from the change in money in circulation. The main distinction is made between the nominal 
amount of money in circulation and the amount of goods said nominal amount can purchase. 
Intuitively, if we double the supply of money and not the supply of goods, then all the money can 
still buy the same amount of goods, so prices will have to double. However, the individual does not 
know at any given time what the exact amount of goods and money are, so price changes do not 
happen instantly. This entails that markets are not always efficient if there are shocks to either goods 
or the money supply. The goal of monetary authorities should then be to maintain stability and 
predictability in the purchasing power of money, primarily by keeping the supply of money 
relatively stable. He further asserted that fiscal policies are ineffective tools to deal with supply-
demand disparities, as increasing government spending will simply "crowd-out" private spending 
and not have any net impact.
 2.2 Positive feedback and financial acceleration
 2.2.1  Debt deflation
A recurring theme in economic theory is the idea that shocks are absorbed and their effects 
dampened over time as the economy adjusts in a rational manner. Certainly this is true for goods, as 
no producer can survive for long if there is no demand for his goods. Even so, the great depression 
in the 1930s prompted economists to explain how the economy could crash to such an extent. 
During this period Irving Fisher had lost a great deal of his personal wealth and professional 
reputation by believing and publicly stating in the early stages of the depression that the market 
would soon shrug off the slump and recover to produce new heights in asset prices (Teach, 2007). 
As a response to the experience from the great depression, Fisher (1933) produced a different 
theory, explaining the interaction between debt and economic activity in an original way. In his 
debt-deflation theory he likens the majority of products, prices or sectors in an economy to a ship, 
which under normal circumstances will tend to stabilize itself after a lesser shock, but if it receives 
too great a blow to the side, will capsize and not return to "equilibrium". Further he explained that 
there are so many and continuous shocks of various sizes that we can never really say that any 
significant portion of the economy is ever in equilibrium: "It is as absurd to assume that, for any 
long period of time, the variables in economic organization ... will 'stay put' in economic  
equilibrium, as to assume that the Atlantic Ocean can ever be without a wave" (Fisher 1933, p. 
339). Fisher then considered which of the mechanism of the economy which had in the past or at 
least the potential to capsize the economy. In his view the traditional explanation of over-production 
or under-consumption could cause minor disturbances, but alone they were not strong enough to 
cause significant problems. On the other hand, the positive feedback between debt and price-levels 
(the purchasing power of the monetary unit) could significantly disturb the economy. He proposed 
the following sequence of events:
1. Suppose there is a state of the world in which many agents have taken on excessive debt to 
finance their investments. Suppose further that in this state some bad news which increases 
the volatility of future cash flows occur. As a response, creditors become nervous about the 
ability to repay the debts and will seek to reduce the leverage of investments in order to 
make their loans safer and will also increase the interest rates on new loans. In addition, 
some borrowers will sell to close the speculative positions.
2. Fewer new loans being issued than old ones repaid causes a contraction of the money supply 
in a fractional banking system and a fall in the velocity of circulation of money.
3. Nervousness to buy and less money chasing the same amount of goods, causes a deflation in 
prices. Falling prices, means a devaluation of firms' assets and they will record losses. It also 
increases the burden of the remaining debt (as money is more valuable when it is in shorter 
supply), making other agents relatively more indebted and prompting or forcing more 
liquidations.
4. Lower profitability, causes a reduction in investment, employment and output. It also causes 
more pessimistic outlooks and hoarding.
5. Careful agents further slow the velocity of money reinforcing the initial downward trend.
Once the spiral is started, the effects are difficult to trace in sequence, but the main point is that the 
effect is reinforcing itself. In modern language, there is positive feedback. Fisher's debt-deflation 
theory fell in the shadow of John Maynard Keynes ideas which the mainstream economists 
embraced at the time. The debt-deflation theory was predominantly ignored by the mainstream, but 
the work of Hyman Minsky, which is explored in some detail later in this thesis, builds crucially on 
it. 
 2.2.2  Financial acceleration
The understanding that economic downturns are amplified by a worsening of credit markets have 
received little attention by the mainstream economic literature, however there are some exceptions 
beyond Fisher (1933) and Minsky (1977; 1990): In Eckstein & Sinai (1986), the authors analyze the 
eight cycles observed between the end of the second world war and 1986. They find that although 
the duration, amplitude and causes of fluctuations vary, there are recognizable stages, which have 
been observed by previous authors. Further they observe that along with fluctuations in the real 
economy there were equivalent movements in financial markets with every one of the eight cycles 
in the post-war period. The stages thus identified have a real part and a financial one which are 
intimately connected and inseparable: (1) recovery/credit expansion, (2) boom, (3) peak/tighter 
credit, (4), recession/contraction of credit. The effect is less obvious in the expansionary phases, but 
the authors observe that every crisis entails a "credit crunch" (Eckstein & Sinai, 1986). The authors 
point out that the financial aspect accelerates the trend, particularly in the credit crunch stage:
At the crunch stage of the business cycle, the degree of financial risk that is present  
constrains sectoral spending, limits the availability of credit, can result in  
bankruptcies, default, and failures, and intensifies the downturn in the economy.  
(p.59)
Bernanke, Gertler & Gilchrist (1996) also pointed out that economic downturns can be amplified by 
worsening credit conditions. However, it is argued in a different manner: The authors point out that 
there is a cost to obtaining external finance, attributable to information asymmetry and agency 
problems. This cost is inversely proportional to the agents' net worth. A shock, either positive or 
negative, affects the smaller units to a larger extent, but nevertheless amplifies a macroeconomic 
trend.
Kiyotaki & Moore (1997) modeled the positive feedback mechanism between the real and financial 
markets. A temporary negative shock to output to credit constrained firms will cause them to cut 
back future investments. The lower revenue in each successive period means investment must also 
be reduced in all subsequent periods. For markets to clear prices must fall, causing a further 
reduction in firms net worth. In particular for the highly leveraged firms, the effect is dramatic. The 
initial shock is thus subject to an "intertemporal multiplier process" (Kiyotaki & Moore 1997, 
p.213). 
The central point of difference between positive feedback and financial acceleration is that the 
former creates endogenous economic cycles, whereas the latter only amplifies an existing shock and 
does not affect the probability of a subsequent movement in the same direction.
 3 Financial instability hypothesis
 3.1 The theory
The financial instability hypothesis (FIH) was developed by Hyman Minsky (1977) as a response to 
the failure of the standard neo-classical synthesis to explain how and why financial crises and large 
economic fluctuations occurred. In the neo-classical models the economy constantly gravitates 
towards equilibrium, although it is understood that it will never actually rest in equilibrium because 
of frequent shocks and the inability of firms to adjust completely in the short run. It is understood 
that these dynamics will give rise to fluctuations over time, but there are no dynamics which 
indicate that the economy can in fact be inherently unstable and tend toward breakdown rather than 
equilibrium in the long run. 
Minsky's financial instability hypothesis takes its cue from the debt-deflation theory developed by 
Irving Fisher (1933). Fisher found that in the central characteristic of the great depression was that 
the economy had come from a period of debt fueled asset price inflation. Subsequently, an initially 
small number of nervous borrowers or lenders decided to liquidate their assets to lower their 
leverage. More sellers led to falling asset price and meant more investors were forced to sell to meet 
margin calls. This initiated a spiral of debt deflation and falling asset prices. Fisher emphasized that 
this spiral was caused by endogenous forces, contrary to the more popular view that the economy is 
inherently stable. 
Whereas Fisher focused on describing the anatomy of debt-deflation that takes place after the upper 
turning point is reached, the financial instability hypothesis extends the theory with a corresponding 
explanation for the way in which the economy will produce a state of high indebtedness, completing 
the circle. The theory explains that when investors are optimistic, increasing leverage amplifies 
returns. Such optimism combined with a liberal access to credit from lenders who are likewise 
optimistic fuels a debt financed asset price bubble. 
 3.1.1  The economics
For the main proposition of his hypothesis, Minsky (1977) points to Keynes response (1937) to 
professor Jacob Viner (1936) at the university of Chicago who posed that "[Keynes] General theory 
really did not make a sharp break with traditional economics and that Keynes achieved novel results 
because velocity was allowed to vary and prices and wages were assumed to be rigid." Minsky 
argues that Keynes response is the key to understand the break between the old and the new and that 
it indicates a theory which gives explanations of the anomalies of crisis and large fluctuations we 
observe which standard theory cannot provide. 
The new theory attempts to explain the determination of two sets of prices. Capital and financial 
assets is one set and output and wages is the other. In order to understand how these prices emerge, 
Minsky focuses on the decisions to be made by investors or investment banks. These agents must 
make decisions about purchases and sales of assets whose future cash flows are uncertain. The price 
is also affected by the opportunity cost of holding it. Hence the price of an asset will also change 
when alternative investments become more or less profitable. For example, a bond whose cash flow 
is fixed in the contract terms will still fluctuate in price depending on the interest rate on new bonds 
and the aggregate demand for holding bonds instead of other assets, like stocks.
In Minsky's view, agents face irreducible uncertainty when making investment decisions, meaning 
the probability of future events cannot be accurately estimated such that risks can be hedged. The 
consequence is that the price of assets whose majority of cash flows are some time ahead, reflect the 
fleeting opinions of buyers and sellers about future profitability and opportunities. The opinions of 
individuals and firms are subject to sudden, significant changes when unexpected news arrive. They 
might also be influenced by widespread overconfidence in boom periods or fear and panic in 
crashes. Investors also face uncertainty with respect to the cost of raising money by borrowing. The 
market conditions will determine the debt structures that lenders and investors will agree upon, in 
terms of interest rates and collateral. Thus, both investment levels and lending practices depend 
crucially on the agents' views which, as argued above, can change rapidly. 
A central argument to the theory is that the opinions of agents are affected by their experiences in 
the near past. For example, when there has been an economic crisis in the near past, investors and 
lenders are cautious to act and more prudent in their estimations of future earnings. When a long 
time passes without any crisis occurring, in which there is steady growth, those same agents will be 
more optimistic. Because agents' estimations in turn determine price, this dynamic gives rise to 
cycles.
 3.1.2  An illustration of the cycle
1. To illustrate the FIH, Minsky starts with a cyclical economy which has in the near, but not 
immediate, past been in a slump or recession and is now recovering. In this economy the 
agents will be cautious with their money and only invest in the most promising ventures. 
This is reinforced by banks which are also restrictive in their lending, so that debt financing 
is limited to only a few ventures with virtual guarantee of repayment. In modern terms we 
would describe this by a strong risk aversion and agents requiring a high premium to take on 
risk.
2. As time progresses in this atmosphere, the economy will grow slowly, but almost all of the 
projects undertaken will be successful, because the riskier ones were simply not financed 
into existence. The successful projects which were leveraged, returned amplified profits to 
its investors (Fama, 1970). 
3. The reaction to this is that investors and bankers reconsider their risk aversion. There is no 
landslide change, but as time goes by with a great number of successes in the market, the 
agents start to consider less prudent strategies. Investors look for new projects to invest in or 
revalue existing ones, finding that with less discounting from risk, valuations are now 
higher. They then turn to bankers for financing, who have similarly determined that because 
they had a low default rate, they could have increased their income by lending out more 
funds. As a result, lenders become more willing to allow for debt structures which involve 
higher leverage. The last decade would certainly be a good example of investors eager to 
purchase assets and banks lowering their lending standards.
4. The increasing will and ability to invest translates into rising asset prices, which again 
serves to validate the inflated valuations and for some to argue for even higher leverage. 
This self-reinforcing cycle of increasing leverage and rising asset prices pushes leverage and 
prices ever upwards. On top of this, it is a characteristic of growth or boom periods that 
there is financial innovation which serves to increase further the amount of available 
financing (Minsky, 1977). Over time, the steadily growing economy characterized by 
prudent agents turns into a booming economy where agents borrow funds to finance 
investments at inflated prices.
5. High leverage leaves agents with low liquidity and high sensitivity to interest rate changes. 
As the market soars towards its peak, eventually some investments will not live up to 
expectations and/or fail completely. The most optimistic investors will be hit first because 
they calculated further price increases into their valuations. Without asset price appreciation, 
they are unable to meet their obligations and the banks which financed their investments will 
reevaluate the risk premium on all their loans and increase interest rates to cover their losses. 
6. Once the rising trend is broken, the increasing number of sellers in the market causes the 
price to drop. At a lower price, more leveraged agents are forced to sell to meet margin calls 
on their loans or do so in fear of further price crash. Repayment of loans also means a 
contraction of the money supply, which suppresses prices and makes the debt burden heavier 
for the remaining borrowers, motivating them to reduce their leverage. The result is a 
downward spiral of leverage and prices, which is exactly the reverse of the previous rising 
price and increasing leverage. 
Minsky argues that the crisis can be aborted by either the central bank flooding the market with 
funds and/or the government running large deficits to maintain income and profits. Even so, with 
the central bank solution there are known dangers of stagflation and with the public deficit solution 
there is a danger of preserving the asset price bubble or creating a new one.
 3.2 The model
Australian economist Steve Keen has produced a model of Minsky's financial instability hypothesis. 
The model, first published in 1995, builds upon the framework produced by Goodwin (1967). The 
sections below outline the history and a brief discussion on the methodology.
 3.2.1  Dynamic modeling
Key features in dynamic modeling which were later used by Goodwin (1967) were originally 
introduced by biologists Alfred Lotka (1925) and Vito Volterra (1926) who simultaneously and 
independently produced what is today known as the predator-prey system. The model describes the 
populations of two species in an ecological system where, as the name suggests, one species are 
predators which prey on the other. If there are plenty of prey, the predator population will grow, but 
if the predator population is too great compared to the population of prey, there is not enough food 
for them to thrive and the predator population will shrink. Conversely if there are few predators, the 
prey population will be able to grow and if there are many predators, the prey population will 
shrink. More formally, let the populations of prey and predator be represented by x and y, 
respectively. Further a is the growth rate of prey, b is the rate at which prey is hunted, c is the 
mortality rate of predators without prey to eat and d is the growth rate of predators per prey eaten. 
Then we have the following model for the development of the two populations over time: 
dx
dt
=ax−bxy  (1)
dy
dt
=−cy+dxy  (2)
a ,b , c , d , x , y≥0  (3)
Equation (1) describes the rate of change for the prey population. We see that in the absence of any 
predators (y=0), the population grows exponentially at rate a, but when predators are present, the 
growth rate is reduced proportional to the size of the predator and prey population. Equation (2) 
describes the rate of change for the predator population. If there are no prey (x=0) then the predator 
population will diminish off at rate c, but if there are prey, then the population growth is greater 
than -c.
An important finding of the Lotka-Volterra type system is that the evolution over time of the two 
populations will for certain values of the parameters a, b, c and d, as well as initial conditions x(0), 
y(0) give either a stable population for both species, known as a fixed point or equilibrium or a 
forever repeating cycle of growth and decline in both populations, known as a limit cycle. In 
particular, if we choose initial conditions such that:
x (0)= c
d
= x* , y(0)=a
b
= y*
dx
dt
=a c
d
−a c b
d b
=0
dy
dt =
−a c
b +
a c d
b d =0
The figure illustrates that to the left of the vertical dashed line (x < x* = c/d), y is increasing, as 
Illustration 3.1: Goodwin growth cycle dynamics
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there is enough prey for predators to eat to increase their population. To the right of it (x > x*), y is 
decreasing, because there is insufficient prey for them to eat. Similarly, below the horizontal dashed 
line (y < y* = a/b), x is increasing, as the prey population is reproducing quicker than the predators 
slay/eat them. Above the horizontal line (y > y*), x is decreasing because high predator population 
eats prey quicker than they reproduce.
The point (x*,y*) is the fixed point of the system, where no change in populations occur over time. 
If we start observing the system when it is sufficiently close to this point, the system will repeatedly 
trace the same closed orbit around this point. If a one-time disturbance throws the balance off the 
original orbit, the system will move to another orbit and stay upon it. Every point that is sufficiently 
close to the fixed point is a part of another orbit which the system can trace. A system which has 
this characteristic is called conservative.
 3.2.2  Goodwin's growth cycle
In 1967 Richard M. Goodwin applied the Lotka-Volterra's system to explain the cyclical nature of 
the economy by modeling wages and employment as taking the roles of predator and prey, 
respectively. In this model, there are two agents, capitalists and laborers who will share the output 
of production according to the relative strength of their bargaining position. Specifically, laborers 
will demand a wage increase when employment is very high and conversely accept a wage 
reduction when employment is low. When wages are low, the profitability for capitalists is high and 
so they will hire more labor, increasing the employment rate. With increased employment, wages 
again increase. Once wages reach the point where it is no longer profitable to increase investment, 
the trend reverses. Because wages are sluggish to respond to increased and decreased employment, 
the model does not rest in equilibrium, but rather traces a limit circle as portrayed in the previous 
section.
 3.2.2.1  Model assumptions
A1. There is a single sector in the economy which produces a single good. The good is used for 
paying labor and the residual is left with the capitalist to invest in the subsequent period.
A2. After paying labor, all profits are invested.
A3. The ratio of output to capital invested is constant, but the required labor to achieve a given 
production level (and equivalently the labor to capital ratio) falls over time.
A4. Regardless of what labor is paid, all wages are consumed and do not affect incentives for 
investment through secondary channels such as increased demand for consumer goods.
A5. There is a constant rate of growth in the population and the productivity of labor.
A6. All capital is of the type which cannot be disinvested when profitability is low. In order to 
reduce capital, they have to "wait" for depreciation to lower it.
 3.2.2.2  Model definitions
Notation Description Type
K(t) Capital Stock
σ Capital per unit of output Parameter
q(t) = K(t)/σ Output Flow
L(t) Employed labor Stock
a(t) = q(t)/L(t) Labor productivity Variable, endogenous
N(t) Population Stock
v(t) = L(t)/N(t) Employment rate Ratio
w(t) wages Variable, endogenous
u(t) = w(t)*L(t)/q(t) Labor's share of output Ratio
Π(t) = q(t) - w(t)*L(t) Profit Flow
α Labor productivity growth rate Parameter
β Population growth rate Parameter
γ Autonomous wage change Parameter
Note: Time subscripts will be suppressed for simplicity in the following formulae and the following 
shorthand notation for rate of change over time will be employed: 
K˙=dK
dt
, L˙=dL
dt
, and so on
 3.2.2.3  Dynamics
I=K˙=Π=q−w L  (4)
q˙= 1σ K˙=
1
σ (q−w L)  (5)
q˙
q
=
(1−u)
σ
 (6)
L˙= d
dt
( q
a
)= 1
a2
(q˙ a−a˙ q)=(( 1−uσ )−α)L  
L˙
L
=( 1−uσ )−α
(7)
w˙=(−γ+ρ v)w  (8)
a˙=αeα t  (9)
N˙=β eβ t  (10)
Equation (4) incorporates assumption 2: The net profit, after labor is paid, is reinvested. (5) states 
that the change in output scales directly with the change in capital. (6) highlights the percentage 
change in output in terms of the labor share of output u. (7) expresses the change in employed labor. 
(8) says that the rate of change for wages are a linear function of the employment rate λ. (9) 
describes the growth of labor productivity, (10) the growth rate of the population.
From these dynamics, we can derive the change in wages share of output and employment:
u˙= d
dt
( w
a
)= 1
a2
(w˙ a−a˙ w)= w
a
(ρv−γ−α)=−(α+γ)u+ρu v  (11)
v˙= d
dt
( L
N
)= 1
N 2
( L˙ N− N˙ L)= L
N
( 1−uσ −α−β)=(
1
σ−α−β)v−
1
σ u v  (12)
Equations (11) and (12) are recognizable as the standard Lotka-Volterra system with workers share 
of output (u) and the employment rate (v) representing predator and prey, respectively. When the 
employment rate (prey) is high, the workers share (predator) is increasing. When the workers share 
low, employment is rising. The fixed point can be found at:
v˙
v
=( 1σ−α−β)−
1
σ u=0
u*=
( 1σ−α−β)
1
σ
=1−(α+β)σ  
(13)
u˙
u
=−(α+γ)+ρv=0
v *=(α+γ)
ρ  
(14)
As with the predator-prey system, for reasonable parameter values and initial conditions sufficiently 
close to the fixed point, this system is conservative and the trajectory [u(t),v(t)] constitutes a limit 
cycle around the fixed point (u*,v*). 
 3.2.2.4  Cycles
Given the population size (N) and the productivity (a) at a point in time, there exists a unique level 
of capital stock which will employ the equilibrium level of the population:
v *= 1
N
L *= 1
Na
q *= 1
Nav
K *  (15)
It is important to note that the cycles occurs (unless the economy finds itself in the fixed point), 
because the capital stock surpasses the "sustainable" amount K* through the investments of 
capitalists in the time it takes for wages to travel from its lower turning point to the equilibrium 
level. If capitalists had stopped investing at that point and waited for wages to adjust, eventually 
wages would reach the point where the incentive to invest further had disappeared (a small 
investment would be required every period, as K* is unique for every point in time). Because 
investors overshoot the sustainable level, there are cycles in the model. The amount of time this 
overshooting occurs, and consequently the amplitude of the cycles, depend on the speed of 
adjustment of wages. If the speed of adjustment is very quick, then the cycles are equivalently short 
and there is less over- and undershooting of investment. In the extreme, where wages adjust 
immediately, there are no cycles. This is because if the economy was out of equilibrium, the 
incentive to invest would be exactly proportional to the distance between prevailing wages and the 
equilibrium wage. On the other hand, if the speed of adjustment is slow, capitalists will keep 
investing beyond the equilibrium level, because wages are still low enough that profitability is high, 
at that point. The longer time it takes wages to reach the equilibrium level, the longer and more 
severe the cycle becomes.
A word of warning is warranted at this point, concerning the model described above and the one 
below. Depending on the parameters chosen, it may be the case that the capitalists will want to hire 
an amount of labor which is greater than the population, causing the employment rate to exceed 
one. There is not built in a constraint which prevents this from happening in the model, although it 
is possible to specify the wage adjustment and/or investment function such that it will not happen.
 3.2.3  Modeling Minsky
Steve Keen (1995) extended the Goodwin model in order to model the financial instability 
hypothesis. Keen modified the investment function to increase exponentially with profitability and 
added a banking sector which will allow investors to finance the excess of desired investment over 
previous profits by incurring debt. Lastly a government sector is added to intervene and attempt to 
dampen the cycles. In a forthcoming paper, he takes the model one step further and incorporates 
endogenous money in the same model. While the two-dimensional Goodwin model with only 
wages and employment exhibits stable cyclical dynamics, introduction of a third (banking sector), 
fourth (government) and fifth dimension (money) opens for the possibility of instability and 
economic breakdown.
There is a slight change of notation and some new definitions:
Notation Description Type
K Capital Stock
I = dK/dt Net investment, including Flow
v Capital required per unit of output Constant
Y = K/v Output, determined by capital and the 
accelerator
Flow
a(t) = a(0) * exp(αt) Labor productivity Variable, endogenous
L = Y/a Labor required determined by productivity Stock
N(t) = N(0) * exp(βt) Population Stock
λ = L / N The employment rate Ratio
w The wage rate Variable, endogenous
r The interest rate on debt Variable, endogenous
D The stock of debt held by capitalists Stock
d = D / Y The debt to output ratio Ratio
Π = Y - wL - rD Profit is defined as the residual after workers 
and bankers have been paid
Flow
π = Π / Y Profit share of output Ratio
ω = wL / Y Labor's share of output Ratio
b = rD / Y Banker's share of output Ratio
α Growth rate of labor productivity Parameter
β Growth rate of the population Parameter
γ The rate of depreciation of capital Parameter
G Government spending Flow
g = G / Y Government spending as a proportion of 
output
Ratio
 3.2.3.1  Assumptions
A1. There is a single sector in the economy which produces a single good. The good is used for 
paying labor and interest on debt. The residual is left with the capitalist to invest in the 
subsequent period.
A2. Investment is based on the rate of profitability per unit of capital. 
A3. If there are insufficient profits to finance desired investment, the capitalist can borrow the 
balance from the banking sector.
A4. The flow of output to laborers is consumed, regardless of the wage rate and the flow to 
bankers leave the system as well.
A5. Bankers can supply any amount of funds the capitalist requires.
A6. The ratio of output to capital invested is constant, but the required labor to achieve a given 
production level (and equivalently the labor to capital ratio) falls over time.
A7. Regardless of what labor is paid, all wages are consumed and does not affect incentives for 
investment (there is no demand curve or prices).
A8. There is a constant rate of growth in the population and the productivity of labor.
A9. All capital is of the type which cannot be disinvested when profitability is low. In order to 
reduce capital, they have to "wait" for depreciation to lower it.
 3.2.3.2  Dynamics
We begin with the main driver of the system which is the investment decision made by capitalists. 
The main difference between Keen's model and the Goodwin model is that Keen allowed capitalists 
to invest any amount they see fit and assumed that they will invest more when the rate of 
profitability is higher. If the desired investment exceeds profits from the previous period, the firm 
will borrow the necessary funds from the banking sector and pay the prevailing interest rate in any 
given period. Net investment is defined as an exponential function k[.] of the rate of profitability 
less depreciation of capital:
I=K˙=dK
dt
=k [ Π
K
]Y−γ K=( 1
v
k [ π
v
]−γ )K  (16)
The function k[.] will be left in its general form. The important characteristic is that it is increasing 
with the rate of profitability of capital.
Further, the change in output, labor and employment follows directly from the change in capital and 
their definitions:
Y˙= d
dt
( K
v
)=1
v
K˙=( K˙
K
)Y  (17)
Y˙
Y
= K˙
K  (18)
Because output is always proportional to capital, the percentage change in output matches exactly 
the percentage change in capital, as we can see from equation (17) and (18). In other words the 
elasticity is one.
a˙=α a  (19)
L˙= d
dt
(Y
a
)= 1
v
( d
dt
K
a
)= 1
v a2
( K˙ a− a˙ K )=( K˙−αK
v a
)=( K˙
K
−α)L  (20)
L˙
L
= K˙
K
−α  (21)
Labor is also determined immediately from capital, however as the productivity of workers increase 
with time at rate α, a lower labor to capital ratio is demanded by capitalists. Equations (20) and (21) 
state that if there is no change in capital, labor employed will decline at a rate of α. On the other 
hand, if we image an instantaneous change in capital (no time passes), labor would match it exactly 
(in percent).
N˙=β N  (22)
λ˙= d
dt
( L
N
)= 1
N 2
( L˙ N−N˙ L)= 1
N
( L˙−β L)=( K˙
K
−α−β)λ
 (23)
λ˙
λ=
K˙
K
−α−β  (24)
The employment rate λ displays a similar dynamic to labor. It replicates the percentage change in 
capital and is reduced by the increased productivity. The difference is that the rate of employment 
will also decline in time because the population grows at rate β. Equation (24) makes it clear that if 
there is no change in capital (and thus labor employed), the employment rate declines at a constant 
rate as a result of increased productivity and a population growth.
K, Y, L and λ are all linked together explicitly, which means that if we know one of them at a given 
time, we can determine the others. It is in this sense that all four of these variables only account for 
one dimension of the system and we only need one to represent this dimension. Goodwin (1956) 
chose to use the employment rate λ to represent the variables K, Y and L, because it is λ which 
determines the change in the wage rate, but any other will do along with the appropriate 
transformation.
Wages are a function of the employment rate λ:
dw
dt
=w[λ ]∗w  (25)
As with the capital function, the wage rate function w[λ] will be left in this general form. The 
important aspect is that, as opposed to the previously discussed variables (K, Y, L and λ), wages do 
not scale directly with other variables in a given period. In order to determine wages, we must know 
the entire history of another variable: the employment rate. The important characteristic is that there 
will be some level of employment λ=λ ' where wages are in equilibrium, when λ>λ ' wages 
will increase at some rate proportional to the distance λ−λ '=Δ and conversely decline if 
employment is below the equilibrium level.
Because the employment rate falls naturally, et ceteri paribus, as the population and productivity 
increases over time, profitability of capital increases. There is equilibrium in workers' and 
capitalists' share of income if workers demand a wage increases exactly proportional to their 
increased productivity.
 3.2.3.3  Adding the banking sector
Up until this point, the model matches the model outlined by Goodwin very closely. The difference 
from his model occurs because where Goodwin chose arbitrarily to model the scenario where 
capitalists will invest all their residual profit after paying labor, Keen allows the investor to choose 
the desired investment level without this constraint. The difference between the desired investment 
level and the profits from the previous period will be borrowed from- or saved in a bank. Thus we 
introduce the stock of debt D:
dD
dt
=I+γK−Π= K˙+γ K−(Y−wL−rD)  (26)
Equation (26) shows that the change in the stock of debt for any given period is the difference 
between gross investment (net investment plus depreciation) and the residual profits from the 
previous period, after labor is paid at rate w and the debt stock is financed at interest rate r. The 
stock of debt is not described explicitly in terms of other variables. It is determined implicitly by 
summing the required financing from all preceding periods.  
In the Keen (1995) paper, this equation is denoted "dD/dt = I - Π + rD" (p.616), which is obviously 
not correct. There are two problems: First of all, by definition profits are net of interest payments 
rD, thus they should not be added to debt. If we substitute for profits in the equation, it becomes 
clear that the way it stands counts the interest payment twice. Secondly, net investment includes 
replacement of depreciated capital, which must be financed from profits or debt. If we do not add 
the depreciation to the equation, then the replacement of depreciated capital is free. It is also curious 
that the capitalist uses earnings before depreciation as a decision rule for investing. On the other 
hand, given a fixed depreciation rate, it is a simple matter to tweak the investment function to 
account for it. In any event, the erroneous equation is replaced with the correct one in the version of 
the model presented in "Commerce, complexity and evolution" (Keen, 1996, p. 96). It is still 
unclear whether the right or wrong form went into the simulations in the 1995 paper.
The change in debt as a share of output is:
d˙= d
dt
( D
Y
)= 1
Y 2
( D˙Y−Y˙ D)=( K˙+γK−Π)
Y
− Y˙
Y
d  (27)
d˙=(v−d )( K˙+γK
K
)+d γ−π  (28)
Equation (27) derives the change in the debt to output ratio, separating the debt effect from the 
output effect. The first term accounts for the effect due to new debt: When it is positive, new debt is 
incurred; when it is negative, the capitalist pays down debt (saves). The second term accounts for 
the change in output: If the first term is zero, gross investments equals exactly profits, and the 
percentage decrease in the debt to output ratio, matches exactly the percentage increase in output 
(equivalent to the percentage change in capital). This is the case because the debt stock (D) is 
unchanged, but output (Y) has increased. Equation (28) highlights the change in terms of the gross 
investment, depreciation and profits. The (v - d) term denotes the equity financed part of 
capital/output. We see that if gross investment is zero, then the sign on the change to the debt level 
depends on whether profit share of output is greater than the depreciation rate. It brings out the fact 
that when profitability and consequently investments are very low, the debt ratio is still increasing at 
the rate of depreciation. This is important for the stability of the system, which is discussed in more 
detail below and in the next section.
The interest rate is assumed to be a linearly increasing function of the debt to output level:
r=ς+φ D
Y  (29)
This can be motivated by arguing that the probability of default, which is the risk exposure of the 
bank, increases with the leverage of the investor. In the model, output is always proportional to 
capital, thus an interest rate proportional to the debt-to-output entails that it is also proportional to 
the more common measure, debt-to-equity. The simplification is made here that the interest rate on 
all the debt changes when new debt is issued or old debt retired, which means that the interest rate 
is floating (variable or adjustable), rather than fixed. This is not an unrealistic assumption, but it is 
problematic because the capitalist is not taking the effect on old investments into consideration 
when incurring new debt, which is discussed in more detail in the evaluation section below.
Given this relationship, we can describe explicitly the change in the interest rate as:
r˙=φ d˙=φ((v−d ) K˙+γK
K
+(d γ−π))  (30)
Again we see the connection to the stability of the system: When investment is low, the debt to 
output is determined by the difference between depreciation and profits. If the economy enters a 
state where the depreciation of capital is greater than profits, d will increase and consequently the 
interest rate too. The result is that the interest payment burden becomes greater in subsequent 
periods, bringing net profits down even lower. An extended discussion on stability follows in the 
next section. 
Finally, we can determine the share of the output which is spent on interest payments:
b˙= d
dt
( rD
Y
)=r˙ d+d˙ r=φ d˙ d+d˙ r=(r+d φ ) d˙  (31)
b˙=(r+d φ)((v−d ) K˙+γK
K
+(d γ−π))  (32)
Because profit is determined as the residual of output after wages and interest on debt is paid and 
profitability per unit of capital in turn determines investment levels, the wages and interest burden 
drives the fluctuations of the system in a cyclical manner:
1. When wages and interest rates are low, profitability is high. High profitability leads to high 
investments. However, as opposed to the Goodwin model, where capitalists are constrained 
in the maximum amount they can invest, in the Keen (1995) model the expansion of capital 
can happen at a much more rapid pace by incurring debt.
2. The high employment rate and increased debt stock increases the wage rate and interest 
rates, respectively, at the expense profitability. As discussed in the Goodwin model, the 
capitalists overshoot a sustainable level. In addition to the slow adjustment of wages, 
interest rates are artificially kept low by the inflated economy. This aspect is discussed in 
more detail below. 
3. Lower profitability induces a reduction in investments. Eventually profitability falls to the 
point where the capitalist stops incurring additional debt, but the wage bill keeps increasing 
for a time period which depends on the speed of adjustment (like discussed in the Goodwin 
model).
4. At this point, low investment combined with depreciation causes the economy to contract. 
However, while falling wages in isolation would translate into higher profitability, the debt 
burden becomes greater when output is shrinking. If the debt is not being repaid at a faster 
rate than the economy is shrinking, the interest rate will increase making the debt burden 
ever heavier. The crucial question for the stability of the system is whether wages falls 
(increasing profitability) quicker than interest payments are rising (decreasing profitability). 
 3.2.3.4  Stability
In terms of stability, the question is whether there are sufficient profits in the contracting stages of 
the cycle (when profitability and investment is low) to service and/or repay the debt which was 
incurred in the expansion. In order for profitability to return to levels where investments are 
lucerative, wages and/or interest rates must come back down. 
Wages are an automatic stabilizer for the system, because although it adjusts slowly, it increases 
when the capital stock is large and falls when the capital stock is small. When investment is high, 
increasing wages reduce the incentive to invest and when investment is low, falling wages make 
investment more attractive. 
Interest rates, on the other hand, have a destabilizing element to it. Interest rates should rise when 
investment is high and debt is incurred, but the effect is diminished because the economy is also 
growing. When profitability and investment is low, the upward pressure on interest rates is 
amplified because output is falling (from depreciation). This is a result of the D/Y term in 
determining the interest rate. When the economy is expanding, although debt is incurred, the 
increased output Y suppresses the overall effect on d. Conversely, when the economy is contracting, 
investment is falling, Y is decreasing and thus D/Y is getting larger.
It is ironic that the debt by itself does not cause instability. When the debt was incurred it was 
rational for the capitalist to do so, because at that time the profitability was sufficient to service the 
debt. The possible instability exists because even after the capitalists stop incurring additional debt, 
wages keep rising (as discussed in the Goodwin model), such that profitability continues to decline, 
after it reaches the point where it could just barely sustain interest payments. If wages were to adjust 
immediately, the capitalists would not incur debt that would later become unsustainable.
The question of stability is thus answered by whether the debt burden increases quicker than the 
falling wages alleviates it, in the contraction stage of the cycle. This depends on the duration and 
severity of the cycles in profits, wages and interest rates, which really depends on the investment 
function and the speed of adjustment of wages. If the capitalists and bankers are prudent and 
cautious, the cycles will be moderate because they will not incur unsustainable amounts of debt in 
expansions. In contractions there will be more profits than interest payments, allowing the debt to 
be repaid. On the contrary, if capitalists and bankers are overconfident when profitability is good, 
they will incur excessive debts which they are unable to settle during contractions.
Further, there is no guarantee that every cycle will be of the same amplitude. The natural question to 
ask is then: Will the cycles increase, decrease or remain stable in their amplitude? If the cycles are 
characterized by ever increasing amplitude, then eventually the system will collapse once the cycles 
become too large. Conversely, if every cycle is less erratic than the last, the economy will converge 
to a steady state without cycles. Lastly, if cycles are stable in terms of magnitude, then the economy 
will forever be in cycles. 
 3.2.3.5  Adding a government sector
Beyond saving an economy already in crises, the main purpose of public policy for Minsky was a 
preemptive intervention to "establish and enforce a 'good financial society' in which the tendency by 
business and bankers to engage in speculative finance is constrained" (Minsky 1977, p.16). If 
speculation is constrained, the forces which push for asset price bubbles and crashes would be 
severely diminished. Keen modeled such a government by two rules which would govern its 
operations. First, by relating government spending to unemployment, so that it will uphold cash 
flows when private production is low, or decrease:
dG
dt
=G˙=g [λ]∗Y  (33)
Second, the government will increase the tax rate when profitability is high so as to temper 
investors' euphoric expectations:
dT
dt
=t [π]∗Y  (34)
Further there is not a requirement that the government balances the budget each period. Thus, the 
model must be further expanded to allow the government to incur debt if they need to finance more 
expenditure than tax receipts are able to.
dD g
dt
=G−T+r∗Dg  (35)
The model makes the simplification that government income and expenses will only affect 
capitalists. That is, only capitalists pay taxes and all government spending benefit capitalists 
directly. Formally the net profit can be defined as:
Πn=Π−(T−G)=Y−w∗L−r∗D k−(T−G)  (36)
Which means that the change in capitalist debt becomes:
D˙ k=I−Πn=I−Π−(T−G)  (37)
Introducing the government complicates the model significantly. For starters, it will expand the 
number of dimensions of the system from three to six. Further, the government does not directly 
relate income to expenses. Its income increases (decreases) when profitability is high (low) and 
expenses increases (decreases) when unemployment is low (high). Although the dynamics of the 
system entails that these forces will counteract one another to some degree over time, there is no 
budget restriction which ensures that the government will be able to service or pay down its debt in 
the long term. This means that although the immediate effect of introducing government is to 
temper excessive incentives for or against investment, there is no guarantee the debt incurred by the 
government will not grow beyond all bounds. At high debt levels, the interest rate also increases, 
which results in the payments becoming an even larger burden. Accumulation of high debt to output 
ratios has indeed been the case in many western economies over the past sixty years which has been 
characterized by strict monetary policy and high interest rates to keep inflation under control (Keen 
1996, p.25).
 3.3 Evaluation
Keen's model certainly captures some key elements of Minsky's financial instability hypothesis. For 
starters, the financial innovation has led to dynamics in capital markets which cannot ignore the real 
effects of the availability of money on economic activity. Investors' behaviors in this model are 
close to how Minsky described; after a downturn, investment and output will be low, but over time 
high unemployment will bring down wages and make it profitable to invest again. If this occurs 
investors will leverage up their capital to finance larger investments, not taking into account that 
profits might fall in the future and thus present problems servicing the debt they have incurred in 
their euphoria. 
On the other hand, the model does not capture the heterogeneity of investors, which plays a central 
role in Minsky's theory. In the model, all investors behave uniformly and equivalently as if they 
represented a single agent. In Minsky's financial instability hypothesis, it is a central argument that 
investors span a wide range from prudent and conservative to Ponzi strategies. It is an important 
point to note that during boom times liberal lending standards will allow the most optimistic 
investors to significantly fuel the rising asset prices by leveraging their investments. By bidding up 
asset prices, this group of investors forces the remaining ones to either take on more leverage or sell 
their positions. The net result is that they will pull some portion of investors with them. This 
dynamic is simplified away in Keen's model.
The model also avoids explicitly incorporating the memory and expectations of agents into the 
pricing of assets. In Minsky's hypothesis, the driving force of the cycle is that both investors and 
bankers have a memory of the recent past which they extrapolate to future expectations about 
profitability, which in turn forms the basis for investment decisions and the risk premium demanded 
by lenders. Following a recession, Minsky imagined that capitalists and bankers are cautious and 
prudent in their investment and lending decisions. As the expansion progresses, they would then 
become more optimistic and discount the probability of negative outcomes to a larger extent. As a 
result, the overshooting in Minsky's theory occurs because rising asset prices yields superprofits to 
investors over a short time period, incentivizing investments which subsequently fulfills the 
expectation of further asset price increases. In Keen's adaptation of the Goodwin model, the cycle 
occurs as a result of real changes in profitability (the slowly adjusting wage rate), rather than the 
more intangible expectations of investors and bankers.
There are also some loose ends in the model. There is, for example, no explicit modeling of the 
supply of credits available for lending/borrowing. The only way in which lending is constrained, is 
through the increasing interest rates from maintaining higher debt to output levels.  As workers do 
not save and capitalists' savings are negative debts, there is no closed system of all the flows within 
the system. Keen (1995, p. 614) argues that this is a simplification we can live with in order to focus 
on the dynamic forces which produces cyclical movements in the distribution of output between 
capitalists, bankers and workers. However, it is not clear how the dynamic behavior would change 
if such limitations were implemented on the supply of funds. In a currently unpublished paper, Keen 
(2011) argues that the supply of funds is an irrelevant question for bankers, quoting Alan Holmes 
paper from 1969 which states: “... In the real world banks extend credit, creating deposits in the 
process, and look for the reserves later” (p.73). 
The open ends of the system described above causes the debt induced breakdowns which Keen's 
model produces (without government involvement) to be questionable. In the model, the breakdown 
occurs when profitability is low, such that investment stagnates, and the share of output of the 
banking sector is growing more rapidly than the wages expense is falling. When the distribution of 
output between the sectors is disproportionally shifted towards interest payments on the debt stock, 
profitability never resurfaces to the point where capitalists replace depreciating capital. Eventually, 
there is no capital or labor employed. Certainly, this would be the demise of the original capitalists 
who over-indebted themselves to the point where profits could not sustain interest payments, even 
at very low wages. Even so, it is unlikely that the economy would break down in this way, because 
the output/money spent on interest payments would not vanish or be used exclusively for 
unproductive purposes. Unless bankers (or laborers) hoard money, even when their incomes become 
large, one should think that they would become capitalists by saving/investing some of their income 
or increase demand for goods and services, pushing for higher prices and profitability. In the model, 
the output which is distributed to workers and bankers flows out of the system, regardless of its 
size, which is highly questionable. It is possible for capitalists to ruin themselves, as a result of the 
destabilizing effect of debt and interest rates, but it is unlikely that this alone would cause an 
economy-wide breakdown.
Overall the model makes significant simplifications which abstract it from reality. Given that the 
model describes a bird's-eye view of the economy, we cannot expect it to capture every detail. This 
is a trade-off between accuracy and generality of the model.
 3.4 Summary
The financial instability hypothesis argues convincingly that there are inherent forces in the existing 
economic system which generates cycles, which are necessarily stable; longer investment horizons, 
less speculative investments and stricter lending conditions/practices would go a long way to 
temper these cycles. The modeling by Keen (1995) captures some central elements of the 
hypothesis and does confirm that such an economy can produce instability, however it does leave 
room for further development to more accurately capture the full network of flows and feedbacks.
The question of policy is more straight forward, but also politically unpopular. Once a crisis occurs, 
however, there is no painless way out of it. There are two ways forward and both involve large 
concessions and restructuring costs. Manufacturing inflation to sustain incomes is essentially a 
wealth transfer from borrowers to creditors, because the real value of old debt decreases. This may 
cause rising interest rates and a loss of confidence as businesses become uncertain of future costs 
and profits and thus become hesitant to engage in economic activity. We also risk building a new 
asset price bubble, more severe than the previous one. On the other hand, if we employ the 
government to expand spending to sustain demand, there are still large restructuring costs as 
individual sectors of the economy must down-size, labor retrained, assets liquidated and reinvested. 
The budget deficit must be financed by increased taxes, but not necessarily in the same period.
 4 The leverage cycle
 4.1 The theory
Geanakoplos (1997; 2003; 2011) argues that the macroeconomic models used by government 
planners, economists and central banks are missing a crucial element to account for shifts in 
economic conditions. In particular, he points out that we cannot rely on the interest rate alone to 
gauge the conditions in financial markets which affect the real economy. While the interest rate 
certainly is one part of the puzzle, Geanakoplos argues that to fully describe equilibrium in 
contracts, we must also account for collateral and the terms of default. A shift in the perceived 
and/or acceptable risk for investments, may not result in a lower interest rate, but rather be 
expressed through lower collateral requirements on loans. When certain agents gain access to 
additional leverage (gearing), they will use their increased purchasing power to buy more assets, 
bidding up prices in the process. Hence, the interest rate may remain unchanged while financial 
conditions have significantly changed, causing a major impact on the economy. If governments 
equate a stable interest rate with tranquil economic conditions, they might misjudge the situation 
considerably. The rest of this section traces the chain reaction set in motion by changes in the risk 
perception and/or risk aversion of lenders to fluctuations economic activity.
 4.1.1  Risk and collateral
A money loan involves two problems for the lender; the opportunity cost and the risk of default, 
that is, being unable to use the funds until they are repaid and the risk of permanently losing the 
funds. While the opportunity cost depends on external forces, which neither borrower nor lender 
can directly affect, the risk of default can be managed by the specifics of the loan contract. To be 
more specific, the question of who bears the losses in case of a default can be managed. This is the 
purpose of the collateral. The collateral is a subset of the borrower's assets, which the loan contract 
gives the lender the legal right to confiscate, if the borrower fails to repay the loan. In particular, the 
lender has the right to liquidate the asset and use the proceeds to repay the debt.
If the value of the collateral is always sufficient to repay the loan, the lender is not exposed to any 
risk of losses even if the borrower cannot repay him in the regular way. The problem is that the 
value of the collateral is not fixed over time in most cases. Businesses usually provide their assets as 
collateral -- individuals their homes. The value of a firm's assets are usually stable as long as the 
business is operating normally, but if the firm encounters financial distress, the value of their assets 
will generally fall. For individuals the most common example is a mortgage loan, where the house 
itself is the collateral. Again, property values are stable or slowly rising "in normal times", but they 
are susceptible to sudden, steep declines which can quickly eradicate the value. If the value of the 
collateral falls below the outstanding principle on the loan, lenders have lost the "guarantee" of 
being repaid and become exposed to the risk of losses.
 4.1.2  Margins and volatility
The critical question is thus: When the value of the collateral varies over time, how much risk is 
each of the two parties (borrower and lender) exposed to? From the lenders perspective, the answer 
depends on how quickly the value of the collateral can fall below the outstanding principal on the 
loan. If he can confiscate and liquidate the collateral before this occurs, then he will not incur any 
losses. There are three factors which contribute to this: 
The first is the difference between the value of the collateral and the outstanding principal on the 
loan, which is called the margin (and is equivalent to the equity financed part of the investment). 
The margin provides a buffer for the lender, because any price decline in the value of the collateral 
will reduce the margin before causing losses to him. As a result, the larger the margin, the lower the 
risk the lender is exposed to. The second component is the future volatility of the value of the 
collateral. In particular, the lender is worried about the probability and size of a downward shift in 
the value of the collateral before he can liquidate it. The third component is the speed with which 
the collateral can be confiscated and liquidated. The longer this window of time is, the larger the 
potential decline in the value of the asset before the lender can intervene to prevent further losses. 
While the delay between a breach of contract and confiscation (beyond the practically possible 
minimum) can be negotiated in the contract, the liquidation may be subject to varying market 
conditions. For example, the agents cannot know in advance how long it will take to sell a house, 
thus the price the market is willing to pay for it might fall in the time before it gets sold.
Because the last two components are largely out of the agents' control, the lender must use the 
margin to offset the probability that the lender will incur losses. This is done by determining a 
threshold value for the margin (margin requirement), which if crossed will trigger a margin call. 
When the borrower receives a margin call he must either restore the margin to above the threshold 
value or surrender the collateral for liquidation. The margin requirement is set such that the risk of 
losses, after confiscating and liquidating the collateral, are acceptable for the lender. It should be 
clear that if the volatility is very low, the threshold can be correspondingly low, while ensuring that 
the probability of losses are negligible and conversely if volatility is high, the lender must demand a 
high margin requirement to ensure the same level of security. The conclusion is that as long as 
lenders do not change their willingness to take on risk, the margin requirements they demand will 
be highly responsive to changes in the estimated volatility of the collateral value.
As a side note before we move on to the next section; while increasing collateral requirements 
makes the loan safer, it also reduces the volume that the lender can collect interest from. In 
particular for banks in a competitive market, operating with stricter or more prudent requirements 
than their competitors will likely lead to lost market shares. On the other hand, lowering margin 
requirements below a "safe" threshold equates to taking on risk. Hence there is a tradeoff between 
safety and competitiveness (risk and reward), which the bank/lender must balance. The variable 
willingness to take on additional risk in order to remain competitive is not critical to establishing 
the connection between margin requirements and economic fluctuations, but it is noteworthy that it 
may contribute to an excessively high supply of credit at times.
 4.1.3  Heterogeneous agents and prices
The previous section established the connection between volatility and margin requirements. This 
one argues for the connection between margin requirements and1 market prices. In order to 
establish this connection, Geanakoplos (2003; 2010) argues that agents have different expectations 
about the future cash flows of assets (their value). The future is uncertain and depends on a large 
number of variables, thus it is not unreasonable that agents have subjective and diverse opinions 
about what will occur, based upon their individual knowledge and/or skills, leading to estimations 
of cash flows (asset values) which differ from those of other agents. Although there are a number of 
reasons that this assumption might be fulfilled, the theory uses the proxy of optimism for simplicity. 
An agent who values an asset high relative to other agents is called optimistic.
If we accept the premise of heterogeneous agents, then we can arrange them according to their 
optimism (valuation of an asset). Furthermore, we can safely assume that a risk neutral investor 
who believes that the asset is worth more than it is trading for, will want buy it. In his opinion this 
constitutes an arbitrage opportunity. An agent in this position will henceforth be referred to as a 
"natural buyer". Conversely, an agent holding the asset will want to sell it if he is offered more than 
he believes it is worth. In order secure more assets, a natural buyer will have to offer more than the 
least optimistic owner of the asset believes that it is worth. With every purchase, he (and all other 
buyers) will face an increasingly optimistic seller in the next round, thus the price increases. 
Theoretically, the most optimistic agent will want to buy the entire stock of that asset, because he is 
willing to offer more than the second most optimistic agent demands to sell it. However, the volume 
that he, or any other natural buyer, can purchase will be limited by the amount of their own funds 
they are willing and able to invest and the amount they can borrow from lenders. The consequence 
is that their leveraged purchasing power depends on the margin requirement. For example, if a 
buyer has $10.000 to invest, and the margin requirement that a lender or the bank demands of him is 
20%, then he can borrow $40.000. The total which he can use to buy the asset is then $50.000. If 
the margin requirement is only 5%, then he can borrow $190.000, and buy $200.000 worth of the 
asset. As argued above, the more he can purchase, the higher the price will become. Hence the 
margin requirement demanded by lenders affect the equilibrium prices. 
The assumption of risk neutrality makes prices particularly sensitive to margin requirements, but it 
is not necessary to choose this extreme scenario in order to generate the effect. As long as the 
natural buyers demand more assets than they are willing and able to spend out of pocket, their 
ability to act and the resulting equilibrium price will depend on the availability of credit.
 4.1.4  Cycles
Based upon the dependence of prices on the expected volatility, Geanakoplos states that cycles of 
asset price bubbles and busts occur because the perceived or expected volatility tends to be 
understated when markets are tranquil or steadily growing, resulting in high leverage and inflated 
asset prices. As long as confidence amongst investors and lenders is high, inflated prices can 
prevail. Hence if confidence is shaken by some significant indication that a major decline is more 
likely than previously anticipated, then the fear of that scenario turn into higher volatility in 
calculations, higher margins and lower prices. It is an important observation to make that the fear of 
a crash can cause it. Even if this fear does not prevail, but there is more uncertainty in both 
directions, such that the probability of both extraordinarily good and extraordinarily bad results are 
higher, the result is the same. The reason is that the creditors are only affected by the potential 
downside, but do not stand to gain from the upside. Thus their expected return and consequently the 
amount they are willing to lend decrease when the volatility increases and vice versa.
The severity of the crash is amplified by the level of leverage prevailing when it starts. It is well 
known from finance that leverage multiplies the investors' returns, both gains and losses. When a 
negative shift in the price of an asset held by a leveraged investor occurs, his equity (and the 
margin) declines by his leverage times the price movement. Lenders will make a margin call once 
the investor falls below the threshold margin. If the market consists of heavily leveraged investors, 
a small price shift can cause a large number of margin calls, forcing investors to sell their positions. 
The flood of sellers in the market cause a further price decline on top of the original one, bringing 
even more investors below their margin requirement.
The crash can also be described in terms of a decreased purchasing power of the most optimistic 
agents. A negative shift reduces their purchasing power by the multiple corresponding to their 
leverage. When they can no longer afford to hold as many assets at the prevailing margin 
requirements, the asset must then be held by some of the less optimistic agents and result in a lower 
equilibrium price.
 4.2 The model 
 4.2.1  A two period model
Geanakoplos (2010) starts with a simple example to illustrate how the equilibrium price is 
determined by heterogeneous agents. In this example there are two periods. The initial or current 
state 0 and a later period in which either state U or state D will be realized.  Let St denote the state 
of the world which is realized at time t. Then, S0∈[0] and S1∈[U , D ] . There are two goods in this 
world; a consumption good (C) and an investment good (Y). Y will yield C if S1=U  and 0.2 C if
S1=D . The aggregate supply of both Y and C are scaled to 1 and both are further infinitely 
divisible and endowed uniformly among all agents in the initial state.
Assumptions:
A1. There is a large number of agents who are uniformly distributed on the interval [0,1] in their 
estimated probability that S1=U  occurs. Put another way, agent h∈[0,1]  believes that 
P (S1=U )=h . E.g. the most optimistic agent (h = 1) thinks there is a 100% chance of the 
Y delivering C and 0% chance that it delivers 0.2 C. Conversely, the least optimistic agent 
(h = 0) thinks there is a 0% chance of the Y delivering C and a 100% that it yields 0.2 C. 
The agents are distributed uniformly between these two extremes.
A2. Agents are risk neutral; they are indifferent between a certain yield and a gamble with the 
same expected value.
A3. Agents try to maximize total consumption and are insatiable in consumption in either 
period. 
A4. Agents are indifferent toward consuming in the early period or the later period. They only 
care about their total consumption.
A5. All trades in one state are made simultaneously in a uniform price auction.
An agent h will determine the expected value of the asset as:
Eh(Y )=h(1)+(1−h)0.2  (38)
If the market price p (exchange rate of C per Y) turns out to be higher than Eh(Y), then the agent will 
stand to gain (in his subjective opinion) from selling (trading Y for C) and conversely if the price is 
lower he stands to gain from buying (trading C for Y). Thus there will be a marginal agent h=b such 
that everyone who is more optimistic than him (buyers) will value the Y higher than it is trading for 
and consequently want to trade all their C for Y and conversely everyone less optimistic (sellers) 
will trade all their Y for C, as they value it less. The equilibrium price will be equal to the valuation 
of this marginal buyer:
Eb(Y )=b(1)+(1−b)0.2= p  (39)
The buyers ( Eh(Y )>p ) will have a total of (1 - b) units of C to trade and the sellers ( Eh(Y )<p ) 
have b units of Y to offer. Thus the exchange rate (price) must be:
p=1−b
b  (40)
Solving for h and p:
b+(1−b)0.2=1−b
b  
0.8b2+1.2b−1=0
b=0.596
p=Eb(Y )=0.596(1)+(1−0.596)(0.2)=0.677
(41)
Illustration 4.1: Two-period model
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A graph of the supply and demand at a range of prices is presented below (a full schedule is 
provided in the appendix). The axes are chosen in the traditional manner, although it is inaccurate to 
say that either price or quantity is determined independently of the other:
This example illustrates how the price is determined in equilibrium. In the model, trading occurs by 
a uniform price auction, where every asset is traded at the price at which there are sufficient buyers 
to purchase the whole supply (Krishna 2002, p.169). This is equivalent to the price where supply 
equals demand. At every price there is a number of agents who demand (want to buy) and all the 
remaining agents want to sell. For every increment of the price, some agents turn from buyers to 
sellers and vice versa. The market clears at the price where the combined purchasing power of all 
the buyers is sufficient to buy the assets offered. An interesting and highly relevant property of this 
market mechanism, which is highlighted in the next section, is that only the valuation of the most 
optimistic agents determines the price. If the most optimistic agents could obtain more funds 
through lending (or endowment for that matter), then a smaller group would hold the complete 
supply of Y and drive the price up further, but they are credit constrained so their influence over the 
price is limited. Further, it should be noted that the uniform price auction suppresses the effect, 
because in order to buy an additional asset, the buyer group has to pay more for every asset. If they 
were able to price discriminate such that they would trade each asset at the value that each 
individual seller demanded, then the average price would be significantly lower and enable them to 
purchase more assets with the same funds, causing the equilibrium price to become even higher.
Illustration 4.2: Supply-Demand for two-period model without borrowing
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In this example, agents are distributed on a continuum, but if their valuations had been discrete, 
then the price would necessarily be negotiated to a price between the two agents who were the 
closest to the market clearing price. In terms of an Edgeworth-Bowley box (Bowley 1924), all of 
the prices between these two agents valuations lie in the core, which neither coalition (buyers or 
sellers) will block. But when we assume a continuous distribution of agents, the solution is unique.
 4.2.2  Introducing borrowing
To illustrate the effect of borrowing on prices hinted towards above, let us first assume that lenders 
demand full repayment in the worst case scenario. Even in the state where Y turns out to deliver 0.2, 
borrowers must be able to repay loans completely. All agents expected values remain unchanged, 
but the budget has changed because the natural buyers now have access to additional funds. In the 
worst case scenario, the full supply of Y delivers 0.2 C, thus the maximum that can be borrowed 
across all buyers is exactly 0.2 C. If this scenario occurs, those who bought will then be left with 
nothing after they repay their debts and sellers will hold the whole supply of both C and Y.
Will optimistic agents borrow the maximum amount that they can? The answer is yes at 0% interest, 
because they are risk neutral and in their view the asset is underpriced. Why would the pessimistic 
agents agree to lend to the optimists? Firstly, there is no risk as the collateral is sufficient to repay 
the loan even in the worst case scenario and by assumption they are indifferent between consuming 
in the first or the second period so they are really indifferent between making the loan and not doing 
so. Secondly, it will turn out that borrowers will only ask to borrow 0.2/0.686= 29.15% of each 
lenders C to fund their purchases, thus the competitive interest rate is 0% with no alternative use for 
the consumption good.
The price is again determined by the total amount of C available to buyers, divided by the amount 
of Y they want to purchase, which must be equal to the valuation of the marginal buyer who is 
indifferent toward buying or selling.
(1−b)+0.2
b
=b+(1−b)0.2  (42)
b=0.686  (43)
p=0.686+(1−0.686)0.2=0.749  (44)
Now that the optimistic agents have access to credit, a smaller group of agents are able to buy the 
entire stock of the assets, because the natural buyers have increased purchasing power. Every buyer 
(except the marginal one) is still credit constrained and if they could borrow more with the asset as 
collateral at no interest, they would still do so, but the example illustrates that when the optimistic 
agents have access to more funds, a smaller group will hold all the assets and will bid up the price. 
This time 31.4% of the agents hold the complete supply of Y, compared to 40.4% before. After 
trading, each buyer then holds 1 / 0.314 = 3.185 times the assets they started with and owe 0.2C / 
0.314 = 0.637 C  in S0 . If S1=D  the 3.185 Y delivers exactly the 0.637 C needed to settle the 
debt, leaving the borrower with nothing. 
The equilibrium price has also increased from 0.677 before to 0.749. One way to think of this is that 
the buyers had to purchase the "last unit of Y" from a more optimistic seller. Again we notice that it 
makes no difference that there are some sellers at the bottom of the distribution which value the 
asset at a price that is far below the market price. These agents' views are not relevant beyond the 
fact that they are located below the market price. All that matters is the purchasing power of the 
most optimistic buyers. 
In the previous two examples, the collateral level was arbitrarily set to illustrate the fact that the 
equilibrium price and the size of the group of asset holders depends vitally on the access to 
borrowing to leverage purchases, but there is no guarantee that markets will decide upon these 
terms for loan contracts or that everyone will trade the same contract. The question is then; what 
contracts will be traded and what are the terms of those contracts? The most optimistic agents still 
find that the asset is underpriced according to their valuation, so they would really like to buy more 
if they could, given that the benefit does not outweigh the costs. Additional borrowing would mean 
that they would default on some part of their debt in S1=D , but it is not unreasonable that the 
lenders will allow this if there was a premium interest rate paid to take on this risk. 
It seems paradoxical that an agent's risk preference appears to depend on whether he is buying or 
selling, particularly because the same agent might become a buyer and borrower or seller and lender 
depending on the distribution of optimism and wealth among the other agents. On the one hand, if 
an agent turns out to be a buyer (asset is underpriced in their view), he is risk neutral, willing to 
gear up purchases until an adverse movement will completely eliminate his equity. On the contrary, 
if the same agent is a seller, because the other agents are more optimistic than him, then he will be 
perfectly risk adverse, unwilling to lend a single dollar unless it is guaranteed to be repaid. The 
answer to this riddle lies in the debt structure which both buyer and lender will agree to.
Geanakoplos (2010) shows that loans backed by less a full guarantee in S1=D will be priced at 
interest rates which vary inversely proportional to the level of collateral, but that these are not 
traded in this example as they denote an inefficient allocation for both borrowers and lenders. 
Intuitively, the lenders would essentially be betting against the belief that they hold (lower 
probability of state U) by allowing additional leverage which only pays off if the economy goes to 
state U and incurring a loss in state D, when the borrower defaults. The buyer faces a similar 
problem: if the economy goes to state D, then his losses are limited to the collateral (he defaults). If 
the economy goes to state U he has more of the asset, but earns less per unit of the asset as a result 
of the interest he now has to pay. At the interest rates which the lender will accept, this tradeoff is 
not lucrative for the optimist who thinks that the state U is more likely to occur. As a result, the only 
debt structure which both borrower and lender will agree to is the one which pays the same in either 
future state. Thus, the apparent disparity of risk preferences of agents is not an inconsistency, but 
merely the result of every agent behaving rationally and utility maximizing.
 4.2.3  A three period model
To illustrate how prices can crash without a crash in fundamentals, Geanakoplos (2003; 2010) 
considers a three period model of a very similar type to the one previously considered. Agents and 
goods are distributed uniformly as before, but information about the investment good is revealed in 
two increments. This time it will take two consecutive "negative" movements for the 0.2 outcome to 
occur, all other sequences deliver 1. Agents believe that the probability of an upward movement in 
each period is h and that the outcomes are independently and identically distributed in both periods. 
Some additional notation is required: Let ps denote the price in state s. Next, a and b represents the 
marginal buyer in S0 and S1=D , respectively. In the third period, the possible states are 
contingent on what state was realized in the second period. The possible states in the third time-
period are denoted: S2∈[UU ,UD , DU , DD ] .
Illustration 4.3: A three-period model
h
h
h
1-h
1-h
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DU;1
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Again, agents can incur debt as long as they are able to fully repay in the worst case scenario. The 
noticeable difference from the previous example is that there will be short term contracts which 
expire after a single period has elapsed. In particular, the debt incurred in S0  expires in S1 , before 
the Y yields any C. Although the assumption is made here that only debt which can be fully repaid is 
traded here, Geanakoplos (2003;2010) shows that it is also the only contract that is traded in 
equilibrium even if we allow the agents full freedom to trade any debt contract. The 2-period 
contract is not traded because it is riskier and thus allow for less leverage.
Further, the asset Y has become more attractive to all agents (except h=1 and h=0), as it takes two 
adverse movements for the asset to deliver the lesser result. Every agent now believes that the 0.2 
result occurs with probability (1-h)2 < (1-h). Agent h now calculates the expected value of the asset 
to:
Eh[Y ]=h2(1)+h(1−h)(1)+(1−h)h (1)+(1−h)2(0.2)=1−0.8(1−h)2  (45)
Agents will behave like they do in the two-period example: They will buy as long as the price is 
below their valuation and borrow to purchase further unless the interest rate discourages them from 
doing so. All the agents who are more optimistic than a (the marginal buyers in S0 ), will 
collectively buy the complete stock of Y on margin. Lenders will demand sufficient collateral to 
settle all debts even in the worst case scenario, thus the amount which can be borrowed depends on 
the price the asset will command in S1=D .  If S1=D , then those who bought in S0  will need to 
surrender all their assets to the creditors to repay the loans. The remaining a agents will then hold 
all the assets and consumption goods. If the supply of 1 asset and 1 consumption good is held by a 
agents, they each hold (1/a) of both goods. There will then be a new marginal buyer b with a pool of 
(1/a)*(a-b) funds with which to buy all the remaining (1/a)b assets. With the full stock of assets, 
they can then guarantee repayment of a debt of 0.2, like before. 
Those are all the pieces needed to establish the price in S1=D :
pD=
1
a
(a−b)+0.2
1
a
b
=1.2a−b
b  (46)
The numerator states the total amount of funds available to the natural buyers in S1=D . The 
buyers constitute the interval [a,b]; those above a are bankrupt and those below b think the asset is 
overpriced. They each hold 1/a of the consumption good C with which to trade and can borrow a 
total of 0.2 C, using the asset as collateral. The denominator states that each of the b sellers hold 1/a 
of the asset.
(46) can be rewritten as:
a=
b(1−pD)
1.2
 
(47)
We know from before that this must be equal to the valuation by the marginal buyer b in state D:
p D=b+(1−b)0.2  (48)
Using the expression for the price in S1=D , the price in S0  can be stated. Because it will be 
possible to borrow pD against the asset, the price is determined as follows:
p0=
(1−a)+ pD
a
 (49)
Further we note that agent a must be indifferent between buying on margin and lending and selling 
(speculating to become a buyer in state D when the price is very low in his view):
       (a )
1
p0− pD
(1− pD)+(1−a)(0)=(a)(1)+(1−a )a(
1−0.2
pD−0.2
)+(1−a )2(0)
(a )
(1−pD)
p0−pD
=(a)+(1−a)( a
b
)  
(50)
Equation (50) warrants some explanation. It states his expected return per unit he spends on either 
of two strategies: On the left, buying assets in S0 , and on the right, saving in S0 (actually lending, 
but it is irrelevant for him as there is no risk or return) and buying if S1=D . For each strategy there 
are three unique scenarios to consider. First if S1=U , second if S1=D  and S2=DU  and third if 
S1=D  and S2=DD . Because agent a goes bankrupt if he chooses to invest at S0 and S1=D , the 
last two scenarios are the same under that strategy.
The left hand side explains that by investing in S0 , agent a can buy (p0-pD)-1 units of Y for each C he 
is endowed with. For each unit of Y he purchases, he will borrow p D (the maximum that lenders will 
allow) and contribute the balance ( p0− pD) himself. If S1=U , which the agent believes will occur 
with probability a, he is left with (1− pD) per unit purchased, after the loan is repaid. If S1=D , the 
agent is left with nothing after the loan is repaid. 
The right hand side explains agent a's valuation of the strategy to sell in the first period and buy on 
margin in the second, if S1=D . If S1=U , which he believes will occur with probability a, a unit 
of C is worth simply C. If S1=D , he will buy assets, paying down ( p D−0.2) on each and 
borrowing the balance. If S2=DU , he will be left with (1−0.2)  per unit of Y, with probability 
(1−a)  and if S2=DD , he is left with nothing. Substituting the expression for p D  from equation 
(48) yields the above equation. 
With the set of equations established above, a trial and error procedure can find the values which 
satisfy all constraints at:
p0=0.95 , pD=0.69  (51)
a=0.87 ,b=0.61  (52)
We notice that the price falls in state D without a crash in the fundamentals as a reaction to the news 
that a bad scenario has become more likely. As Geanakoplos (2010) points out, the price falls more 
than any individual investor expects it to. Part of this fall is due to the increased volatility, but 
another significant part is due to the elimination of the most optimistic investors and the lower 
leverage which lenders will tolerate in the second period. In state 0, the buyers take on leverage of 
0.95/0.26 = 3.6, whereas in state D buyers can only get 0.69/0.49 = 1.4, because when the volatility 
of the fundamentals increase, lenders will not agree to leverage purchases to the same extent.
It is also important to notice that the marginal buyer a thinks that the asset is underpriced (he values 
it at approximately 0.985), but still opts to sell (save) his funds in order to buy on margin if state D 
occurs. A range of agents will do this, "pulling" the price down in state 0. The implications of this 
are discussed towards the end of the next section.
 4.3 Evaluation
Geanakoplos explains convincingly how the market clearing mechanisms produce different prices 
at varying debt structures. It provides important insights onto how given the heterogeneity of agents 
combined with a loosening of collateral requirements results in the price being set by a smaller 
group of investors. The leverage cycle further gives plausible evidence toward the relationship 
between expected volatility and margin requirements, causing significant effects on prices before 
and possibly without there ever being an actual shock to fundamentals.
The theory also suggests answers to observed phenomenon which a rational expectations 
framework does not without resorting to psychological and/or behavioral irrationality. In the model, 
agents are simply utility maximizing given their unique assumptions and information set. 
Heterogeneous agents play the central role, and although a uniform distribution is employed to 
simplify the examples, any continuous distribution would operate by the same mechanisms.
Although the model demonstrates well how prices are influenced by collateral requirements, it does 
not create cycles without some further assumptions about the changing views of market 
participants. In the verbal exposition of his theory, Geanakoplos describes positive feedback in the 
way markets reach the new equilibrium after some news increases volatility forcing agents to 
deleverage:
All three elements feed back on each other; the redistribution of wealth from optimists to  
pessimists further erodes prices, causing more losses for optimists, and steeper price  
declines, which rational lenders anticipate, leading then to demand more collateral. 
(Geanakoplos 2011, p.4)
However, in the model the price movements are simply amplified by the level of indebtedness 
which can be adopted; the feedback is not modeled. This binary mechanism is not procyclical, it 
merely amplifies the shock in the two possible states of the world, without affecting future events. 
When agents claim prices fall "more than their view of the fundamentals warranted", this is exactly 
the result which they anticipated. It important to note is that this is an implicit assumption of the 
model. Without calculating the price fall, they could not set the leverage requirement in the initial 
state. In the three period model, some agents actually used the anticipated price fall to speculate in 
investing in the middle period. It is also misleading to argue as if it was a surprise that "[high 
leverage] will cause a crash even before there has been a crash in the fundamentals and even if  
there is no subsequent crash in the fundamentals."  Every agent knew that this would happen, 
because this is how they set the leverage requirement; that is the arrangement they agreed to. The 
result is that there are no cycles beyond the amplification of the result of "good" or "bad" news.
The high desired leverage amplifies shocks, to which there are associated costs, but does not create 
endogenous cycles without further assumptions about how agents behave or the economy in 
subsequent periods. For example, one could argue that "good news" redistributes wealth towards 
optimists, who might hold on to their optimism and want to buy more, driving prices further up in 
subsequent periods. Another example is when production is added to the economy, as Geanakoplos 
(2010, p. 44) discusses, but does not model. Asset price fluctuations cause difficulty in predicting 
and possibly errors in correctly estimating future profitability, thus opening for over- and 
underproduction.
In the three step model, some agents find it optimal to bet against the market, because they find that 
the asset will be heavily underpriced after a crash and thus it is more profitable than buying it 
outright even if the asset is underpriced, in their view, in the original state. This line of 
argumentation has consequences which would be interesting to pursue. For example, it is easy to 
see that the appearance of such investors in a highly leveraged market can break a spiral of rising 
prices and leverage and cause. There are a number of immediate consequences of the leverage cycle 
which indicates endogenously generated cycles; it is therefore surprising that these arguments are 
not pursued.
A possible short-coming with strict market clearing requirements is that it does not accurately 
describe less efficient markets, such as the labor market, where prices are some degree of sticky 
and/or some resources will not be offered/employed at the market clearing price. Though the focus 
here is on certain assets that are always for sale, it does make the theory less applicable elsewhere. 
This is a trade-off we have to live with, when a model is specific and accurate, there is a good 
chance it will not at the same time be applicable everywhere.
 4.4 Summary
The leverage cycle theory highlights the effect on prices of changes in the expectations that lenders 
hold regarding the collateral. In particular, it points out that even though expected values remain 
unchanged, increased uncertainty about the range of future values or prices has a significant effect. 
This is because creditors have an unlimited downside, but a limited upside. The connection between 
margins and prices is that margins limits the purchasing power of the most optimistic agents and 
hence their influence over prices. The consequence of these two observations is that the interest rate 
does not give the full account of market conditions, because there are really two channels through 
which a change in the equilibrium of financial markets can be expressed; either through interest 
rates or through margin requirements. A government body which seeks to stabilize economic 
fluctuations by only manipulating the interest rate will fail to notice and counteract the effects of 
changes in the margin requirements.
 5 Comparing the financial instability hypothesis to the 
leverage cycle
It is perhaps a leap to say that the theories proposed by Minsky (1977) and Geanakoplos (2003, 
2010) are the same, but central underlying assumptions and arguments are shared. Both argue for a 
relationship between leverage and asset prices, such that an expansion or contraction of credit 
amplify and/or cause corresponding fluctuations in asset prices and investment activity. Although 
employed with certain differences, the connection between leverage and prices is established as a 
result of introducing heterogeneous agents. It is a significant finding that heterogeneous agents can 
affect the real economy, because it contradicts the popular rational expectations theory. While the 
results and conclusions of the two theories are similar, the two associated models discussed in this 
thesis are indeed quite different: While the dynamic model produced by Keen (1995) focuses on the 
continuous feedback between investment and prices to generate endogenous cycles, the 
Geanakoplos (2010) model focuses on the price determination in equilibrium given changes to the 
value of the collateral. 
 5.1 Feedback and cycles
In both theories, economic fluctuations are caused and/or reinforced by conditions in the credit 
market. In the Leverage Cycle (LC), a period of low volatility allows investors to stretch collateral 
further, because lenders perceive that less can go wrong over a short period of time. Prices soar as 
optimistic investors' can obtain more credit and crashes when volatility increases, causing lenders to 
reduce the purchasing power of investors through higher margins. In the Financial Instability 
Hypothesis (FIH), a profitable period makes both investors and banks more optimistic, resulting in 
agents incurring more debt, fueling even higher prices. Both theories agree that high leverage makes 
agents more vulnerable to shocks and that an initial reversal of trends will trigger an avalanche of 
falling prices and forced deleveraging. However, while the feedback is a central element in the 
Keen model, Geanakoplos does not model the feedback explicitly, but focuses instead on how the 
price is determined and moves in different states.
In terms of cycles, the LC model generates amplification of shocks, not cycles. The FIH, on the 
other hand, considers smooth transitions through time with endogenous positive feedback which 
generates cycles. In the LC there are only two states: The "normal" state, in which high levels of 
leverage is undertaken by risk neutral agents and a "crash" state, in which optimists go bankrupt, 
resulting in deleveraging a drastically lower prices. Optimistic agents are knowingly betting all their 
wealth on a positive future asset price, fully aware that they will go bankrupt if they are wrong. This 
is not a procyclical dynamic, but rather an amplification of shocks. Geanakoplos (2010, p. 3) notes 
that if agents do extrapolate trends (as the FIH argues), then the cycles will be much worse, but 
stresses that this is not necessary for excessive price movements and does not go on to model 
another type of feedback like he describes in the introduction. In the FIH there is a continuous 
positive feedback between market conditions and future investments and speculation, such that a 
state of over-leveraging develops endogenously as agents extrapolate a series of repeatedly 
improving past results into ever more optimistic expectations (or negative results into negative 
expectations). 
 5.2 Leverage and debt structures
When it comes to the endogenous borrowing conditions there are differences in argumentation, but 
these are not necessarily contradictory. Minsky argued for and Keen modeled agents whose 
perceptions change with time. Both lenders and borrowers are affected by the memory of the recent 
past. When the past has been profitable, they expect the future to be profitable and thus they will 
both accept an increased level of leverage. Geanakoplos derives explicitly that in periods of low 
volatility, agents perceive investments to be safer, thus more debt can be incurred against the same 
assets, which fits well with the description Minsky outlined.
Both theories argue that a highly leveraged and optimistic agent is rewarded when the economy 
goes well, thus allowing him to take on more debt and make the economy more volatile, as a 
smaller shock can wipe out the equity of investors. Put another way, good market conditions 
gradually redistributes wealth toward the optimistic agents whose increased purchasing power 
allows them to incur more debt and increase market volatility. This is merely implied by 
Geanakoplos' LC, but explored in more detail by Minsky. In the Keen (1995) model, heterogeneity 
is not modeled explicitly, but there is a direct positive feedback between changes in investment and 
production. 
 5.3 Agents
While the agents described are similar in the two theories, there are differences. Primarily, how 
agents are affected by other investors' behaviors. The LC describes a heterogeneous set of agents 
who are risk neutral utility maximizers, given the possibilities they are facing. Even so, it does not 
describe why agents hold the beliefs that they do at any given time or discuss whether perceptions 
change endogenously with market conditions, e.g. perceived stage of the business cycle the 
economy is in. The time component does play a role, on the other hand, as different kinds of news 
generate uncertainty among investors, translating into volatility of results which affects borrowing 
conditions and thus prices. The agents in the LC are also indifferent to the behavior of other agents. 
They will merely acknowledge the market price and determine whether to buy or sell depending on 
their own preferences.
The FIH also emphasizes heterogeneous agents, but also describes the behavior of agents as 
affected by market conditions. In the FIH, increased investment feeds back into rising prices, 
making firms more profitable. When profits are high, agents want to invest further making their 
behavior change significantly depending on current trends. Another key point is that conservative 
investors are forced to deal with market conditions set by speculating or "Ponzi" investors. As the 
aggressive speculators crowd out both investments and the money supply, previously solid firms are 
forced to deal with higher interest rates and rising costs making their own operations riskier and less 
profitable.
 5.4 Price determination
This section asks the question; where do the two theories complement one another and what ideas 
are contradictory? Let us first consider the way margin requirements affect prices. The LC shows 
explicitly how the purchasing power of the optimistic agents increase as a result of lower margin 
requirements. The FIH employs a similar argument, although on the macroeconomic scale. There it 
is argued that new debt "...results in the financing of either some additional demand for capital and  
financial assets or of more investment. This results in a higher price of both assets..." (Minsky 
1986, p. 178). These arguments are sufficiently similar that it can hardly be argued that they 
contradict one another.
The next connection to consider is how agents determine margin requirements. It is clear that once 
expectations are formed, lenders are interested in setting margins such that they minimize the 
chances that they incur losses. Thus the real question is how agents form their expectations in the 
first place. In the LC assumes that agents have knowledge about the range of future values that the 
collateral can take and that they are able to predict other agents actions in each contingency. Thus 
they can calculate the equilibrium price that the asset will command in every possible state. With 
this information, they can set margin requirements such that the collateral is sufficient to settle the 
debt even in the worst case scenario. In the FIH, lenders are really trying to achieve the same result, 
but it is argued that agents are unable to predict the value of the collateral in the future. They must 
instead resort to a trial and error method of setting margins; if losses are below expectations, they 
are emboldened and will try lower margin requirements in subsequent periods and conversely if 
losses are high, they become more prudent and set margins higher for new loans. Neither of these 
two clear cut assumptions are very realistic in every scenario, but each hold a part of the truth about 
how lenders determine margin requirements based on the risk they are exposing themselves to. 
Over a short time horizon, it is plausible that agents can predict with some accuracy what will 
occur. Geanakoplos also finds that agents prefer the short term loans, because the less damage can 
be done in a short time and thus more leverage can be employed over that window of time. 
However, many loans must be made over longer time horizons. For example business loans, which 
are the main focus of Minsky's analysis, generally have long durations. For these loans it is clear 
that it is difficult or impossible for the lender to accurately predict the value of the company's assets 
over the entire course of the contract. 
On the last point, the two theories diverge resulting in different dynamics. In FIH, extrapolating 
recent results cause a positive feedback between expectations, margins and prices. However the 
probability that the trend reverses increases the further away from equilibrium the system gets. The 
result is endogenous cycles of booms and busts. In the LC, shocks are absorbed at every time 
interval. This results not in a cycle, but rather an amplification of good and bad news, as they arrive; 
leverage and prices increasing when good news arrives and falling when bad news arrive. Because 
both theories provide important insights, given different assumptions about behavior, it is more 
accurate to say that the two theories complement each other than it is to say that they contradict one 
another.
 5.5 Theory and policy
Despite their differences in theoretical background, analytical approach and modeling apparatus, the 
policies which the authors prescribe to minimize fluctuations and associated costs coincide with one 
another. While it is still true that there are certain assumptions and mechanisms which are shared, it 
is still a testimony to the robustness of their results that such different analyses end up with the 
same recommendation. In the end, they both argue that governments should intervene before a crisis 
unfolds to ensure that agents are not allowed to incur excessive debt. Minsky is vague about the 
specific measures to be undertaken, but does state that "in order to do better than hitherto, we have 
to establish and enforce a 'good financial society' in which the tendency by business and bankers to  
engage in speculative finance is constrained" (Minsky 1977, p.16). Geanakoplos is more specific as 
he traces the problem to the excessively stretched collateral, making individual investments more 
sensitive to shocks, increasing covariance and systemic risk and consequently causing agents to 
become more susceptible to default. He then argues that by managing not only the interest rate, but 
also collateral, prices would not soar as high to begin with and investments will be more robust 
against shocks so that the chance of margin calls on loans (leading to further sales and price 
depression) are smaller.
 5.6 Summary
The leverage cycle and the financial instability hypothesis both highlight important mechanisms in 
the economy. There are differences in focus, but not direct contradictions in understanding how 
cycles are generated. Where the LC focuses on price determination in equilibrium and the 
connection between volatility, leverage and prices, the FIH describe in greater detail the positive 
feedback effect between expectations, investment decisions, prices and agents' wealth. While the 
underlying assumptions are close to identical, the methodology and modeling are far apart. While 
the LC focuses on microeconomic aspects, modeled by a game theory approach to clear all markets, 
the FIH is angled towards macroeconomic explanations and applies dynamic modeling to account 
for the interaction of different forces in the economy. In the end, both theories argue for the 
curtailing of excessively leveraged speculation. Two theories complement one another well because 
the LC is narrow and accurate, while the FIH is broad and general. Each portrays a different angle 
on the topic, both calling attention to the same issue, namely the close connection between the 
financial sector and the real economy and the problems which arise from excessive speculation.
The next section discusses whether we can see the mechanisms described in the two preceding 
models in real world settings and then moves on to see whether the policies implemented are in line 
with the recommendations provided by these theories.
 6 Discussion
The long run is a misleading guide to current affairs. In the long run we are all dead.  
Economists set themselves too easy, too useless a task if in tempestuous seasons they  
can only tell us that when the storm is past the ocean is flat again. - Keynes (1923)
It has been argued in the preceding sections that there are, on the microeconomic and the 
macroeconomic level, forces which reinforce shocks and potentially drive the economy away from 
a theoretical equilibrium. This contradicts the prevalent efficient market hypothesis, which argues 
that such shocks will be absorbed efficiently (quickly) and a new stable equilibrium reached (Fama 
1970). In particular, the connection between financial markets and the real economy entails 
incentives which produce price bubbles at excessive debt levels which are very likely to produce 
subsequent crashes. It may be the case that if one abstracts from these fluctuations and/or cycles it 
could be observed that the economy is characterized by a slow, steady growth path over long time 
periods. Nonetheless, as Keynes points out in the quote above, it is little comfort to know that 
markets will eventually work things out in the long run, if there are excessive gains and losses in the 
short run. The natural question is thus, do we see price/debt bubbles and positive feedback effects in 
the real world?
 6.1 Procyclical interaction between credit and economic activity
 6.1.1  Leverage inflated asset prices
There is ample support in the literature for a significant correlation between credit and property 
prices in most western countries during the last two decades (Borio, Furfine & Löwe, 2001; Hilbers 
et al, 2001; Hutchison & McDill, 1999). Goodhart and Hoffman (2003) finds the same result and 
adds that credit growth is also leading consumer price indexes, but that it is harder to establish a 
direct connection between credit and stock prices. Semmler & Bernard (2011, p. 3) points to three 
specific examples of credit fueled boom-bust cycles in asset prices: the emerging markets crisis in 
the 1990s, the dot com bubble around the turn of the millennium and the U.S. housing bubble in 
2007.
For a long time the discussion has been over whether or not credit is leading, interpreted as causing, 
changes in other macroeconomic effects. However, this misses the point of positive feedback, 
because in a dynamic system there is not a single cause and effect, there is constant interplay 
between variables. If there is feedback between credit and asset prices, it is of little importance 
which variable moves first, because after an initial shock to either, the effect will bounce back and 
forth. Adrian and Shin (2009) found empirical evidence that firms, and in particular investment 
banks, adjust their balance sheets in response to price movements, in order to target some leverage 
level. This behavior is pro-cyclical, as an increase in prices (which lowers leverage on assets), leads 
to more debt-financed purchases to restore the target leverage level, which in turn pushes prices up 
even further. In a later report, they also found that firms target leverage level was strongly 
influenced by a desire to maintain the Value-at-Risk (VaR) to equity ratios (Adrian & Shin, 2010). 
Again this behavior is also pro-cyclical as firms are forced to deleverage when markets are strained, 
causing even further price depression.
 6.1.2  Interest payments and solvency
One area where the inherent instability of the economy has been particularly visible recently is in 
the interest rates charged on Greek government bonds. The Greek government debt-crisis emerged 
in early 2010 as a result of the rising fear that the Greek government would default on its rapidly 
growing debt. As a result of a combination of falling economic growth and large budget deficits 
before and during the global financial crisis, the Greek debt-to-GDP ratio rose from around 100% in 
2005 to over 140% in 2010 (Eurostat, 2012). At that point creditors began to consider it a 
significant possibility that the Greek government might default on their debt and began demanding 
extraordinarily high interest rates on bonds to compensate them for taking on that risk. Throughout 
2010, interest rates on newly issued bonds rose from 4.72% to 13.75% (Bank of Greece, 2012). 
While this may be bad enough in isolation, the increased interest rates are in fact increasing the 
probability that the feared default will occur. The fear of default causes the interest rates to go up 
and the increased interest rates give the creditors more reason to fear a default.
Once the debt level of the nation reached a sufficiently high level, combined with uncertain future 
incomes, investors became more cautious of lending new funds and demanded higher interest rates. 
Even if the Greek government were to balance their budget, such that the debt stock would not 
increase, they would still have to issue new debt at the market interest rates in order to roll over 
existing bonds as they mature. Their previous budgets were sustainable when they made them, 
given the prevailing market conditions at the time. However, when interest rates rose beyond what 
they expected, their expenses shot upwards. The consequence of higher expenses is that their ability 
to service existing debt and run fiscal surpluses are significantly weakened, giving creditors 
additional reason to fear a default. It is somewhat ironic that without the fear, Greece's financial 
problems would not be nearly as dramatic. Nevertheless, once "the boat capsizes", as Fisher 
explained, the indebted nation's finances do not return to equilibrium, but continues to propel itself 
away from it.
 6.2 Theory based recommendations and actual practice
The U.S. sub-prime mortgage market crash and subsequent global financial crisis is a fantastic 
example of the mechanisms described by the FIH and the LC. A rising trend in housing prices led to 
a low perceived risk attached to mortgage loans. Loose lending practices meant buyers were able to 
bid up prices even further, amplifying the initial trend in prices. Geanakoplos (2011, p. 8) reported 
that the most leveraged half of all loans were issued at a down payment of 13% in 2000 compared 
to 2.7% in 2006 (a dollar of collateral could borrow $7.7 in 2000 and $37 in 2006). Over the same 
time period, housing prices rose by 90%. Between 2006 and 2008, margins rose back to over 15% 
for the same loans and housing prices came crashing down. The falling prices and defaults which 
followed caused a dramatic fall in investments, employment and lending practices which froze 
global credit markets.
In comparing the policy recommended by the FIH and the LC with actual responses there are two 
policy questions to deal with. The first relates to the short run when the crash has just happened: 
What should be done to minimize the duration and costs of the recession? The second is looking at 
the longer perspective: How, if possible, to avoid or reduce the probability of another serious crisis 
in the future? 
On the first question, both theories hold that to prevent or stop a destructive downward spiral in 
prices and economic activity, central authorities should expand credit (restore leverage) to sustain or 
stop the free fall of prices and incomes. This is apparently also the policy which the U.S. 
government and the Federal Reserve Bank (FRB) are pursuing, at least to some extent. The FRB 
increased the supply of money until the federal funds rate reached zero and proceeded to increase it 
further by purchasing other assets from banks (quantitative easing). While the FRB tripled the 
monetary base between April 2008 and December 2011, M2 only increased by about 25% in the 
same period. This means that the financial institutions now have quite large excess reserves and the 
policy has reduced effectiveness because markets have been unwilling increase activity even though 
funds can be obtained at a minimal cost (FRED, 2012a; 2012b; 2012c). This expansion is in line 
with the policy recommended; however, Minsky warned that although increasing the money supply 
can prevent a looming depression: "because the Federal Reserve intervention has protected various  
financial markets, the recovery can soon lead to a resumption of an inflationary boom" (Minsky 
1977, p. 15). The excess reserves give financial institutions the possibility to expand the money 
supply significantly. However, in the current climate there is insufficient demand to make it happen. 
Geanakoplos (2010) also addresses the moral hazard which results from underwater loans. He 
explains that for example home owners with a mortgage that exceeds the house value are unlikely to 
invest in maintaining the structures which results in additional losses for the lenders, as eviction can 
take as long as 18 months. His prescription is to write down the principle on loans to encourage 
lenders to keep the house and avoid additional losses. The "Home Affordable Refinance Program" 
is in line with Geanakoplos recommendation, though it only targets borrowers who are stuck with 
over-market interest rates, not those who are already underwater and most likely to default.
Another response has been certain bailouts and government takeovers of central actors who were 
facing bankruptcy. In March 2008, the Federal Reserve purchased $30 billion of Bear Stearns' 
assets which JPMorgan Chase, who were to merge with Bear Stearns, were unwilling to buy 
(Federal Reserve, 2012a). In the fall of the same year the Federal reserve also created an 
extraordinary line of credit for the American International Group (AIG) of up to $85 billion and 
also purchased approximately $50 billion worth of assets from the company (Federal Reserve, 
2012b). This intervention sought to prevent the escalating panic of the type which Greece is now 
facing. The companies would still be forced to write down the value of their assets, but as long as 
they retain access to credit at "normal" interest rates, their chances are much better than if they were 
to forced to meet the market demands for interest rates. Geanakoplos (2010) arguments for writing 
down principals in times of crisis, noting that creditors are much more likely to be able to collect a 
written down debt which allows the individual or company to continue operating than they are if the 
company were to face an uncoordinated bankruptcy. However, while bailouts may be the best 
course of action in an individual case, it is a dangerous practice as it signals to investors that risky 
investments could be payed for by government intervention. In fact, many economists argue that 
much of the reason why asset prices were inflated and many risky contracts were written in the first 
place was that belief among investors that the government would intervene and pay for their losses 
if the bets went wrong (Bernstein, 2009; Stiglitz, 2010; Trumbull, 2009). This creates an upward 
bias on investments' expected payoffs and could incentivize agents to create another bubble. Thus 
while a countercyclical intervention might be the right approach in theory, it gives rise to additional 
unstable dynamics in the economy . 
The broader question is how to change the financial environment long term to avoid excessive 
fluctuations and bubbles in the first place, rather than letting them happen and implement policies of 
damage control after the fact. To curtail the excessive cycles, the FIH and LC suggest active, 
preemptive management and regulation of credit and leverage so that agents' opportunity to engage 
in speculation are curtailed. Both agree that regulation can produce the desired results in the short 
term, but notes that because the agents are seeking to engage in speculative financing, they will 
attempt to invent new ways and/or asset classes to circumvent existing limitations on their 
activities. On this background, Minsky argues that "any regulatory or intervention system will lose  
effectiveness over time."  (1986). Geanakoplos argues the same way, but his argument centers on 
collateral. He argues that because agents want to create virtually unlimited debt contracts, but 
collateral to guarantee repayment is scarce, agents constantly seek to stretch the little collateral 
which exists in creative ways. He points to the recent crisis in which a variety of derivative 
contracts on mortgages and other assets (MBSs, CDOs) were invented and sold in mass quantities.
The main response of western governments to the recent crisis has been to mandate higher capital 
requirements or equivalently higher margins, lower leverage and less gearing. In the U.S., broad 
changes to the oversight and regulation of financial institutions was implemented with the "Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act" (Dodd-Frank). The reform aims 
specifically to monitor and manage risks to the financial system, through the establishment of the 
Financial Stability Oversight Council, to prevent the need for using tax payers money for bailouts 
of system critical firms and to protect investors by legislating transparency and accountability for 
financial firms (Brost & Oblack, 2012). In Europe, the countermeasures have largely aimed toward 
strengthening individual financial institutions' ability to withstand shocks from internal problems 
and counterparty risks which were a prevalent problem in the recent crisis. The purpose is to 
prevent the possibility that the failure of individual firms spill over to a large number of firms 
causing credit markets to freeze. By legislating minimum capital ratios, it also sets a boundary on 
speculation for central actors in the financial system (BIS, 2010a; BIS, 2010b). 
Both Minsky and Geanakoplos finds that financial institutions are intrinsically motivated to invent 
new ways to stretch collateral to issue more debt. Thus the problem for governments is that while 
the regulations that they put in place will likely produce the desired results for a while, but as long 
as there are agents who constantly seek ways to circumvent these regulations, the rules must be 
constantly updated to remain relevant.
 6.3 Problematizing theoretically desirable policies
While certain policies and institutional structural changes might be technically desirable in the long 
run, there are inherent forces in our economy and our current political systems which will make 
certain policies ineffective, politically undesirable or both.
 6.3.1  Popular resistance
Large entities, like nations, are especially unlikely to default on debt, because their future incomes 
are unlikely to deteriorate significantly. Nevertheless, there is still a threshold for the amount of 
debt they can take on before creditors will begin to consider it to be a real possibility that the 
borrower will default on repayments. Like Greece, several other European countries, including but 
not limited to, Spain, Portugal, Italy and Ireland, have run large deficits immediately before and/or 
during the financial crisis. Combined with low economic growth, these deficits have led to a 
significant increase in the debt burden on these nations' finances. The result is that creditors are 
starting to fear a default, calling for cuts in government spending in order to ensure that there are 
sufficient incomes to meet their debt obligations. At the same time, several of the same countries are 
also plagued by unemployment and low economic activity. While cutting spending in order to 
achieve a budget surplus might be desirable to reduce the debt burden, it will also increase an 
already problematically high unemployment and suppress aggregate demand as a result of the 
reduced income of the laid off workers. 
In nations or unions where both the fiscal authorities and monetary authorities are closely tied 
together, the debt can, of course, be monetized; i.e. repaid by extending a loan from the central bank 
to the government. This is problematic in the European Union, where the interests of the affected 
nations are not completely aligned and the central authorities have limited influence over each 
individual nation's fiscal decisions. In this situation, governments with problematic debt burdens are 
left with the choice between two evils; spending, which will increase the already worrying debt, and 
'austerity', which will amplify the problems of unemployment and low activity. 
Even after deciding which strategy is desirable, either one is likely to be unpopular with a 
significant part of the voters in the country, making it politically unviable to implement. 
Governments who attempt to implement a policy which is unpopular will likely be replaced at the 
next election. Recent elections in Greece and France have shown that their population will resist 
'austerity measures' and elect a political leadership who do not seek to curtail growing debt by 
cutting social programs (Barkin, 2012; Granitsas, Bouras & Stevis, 2012; Heyer, 2012). Similarly, 
last year, elections in Spain, Portugal and Ireland replaced governments which failed to handle their 
respective nation's finances and unemployment problems in a satisfactory manner (Tremlett, 2011; 
Woolls, 2011). In Italy, Berlusconi was forced to resign, in similar circumstances to the previous 
Greek Prime Minister Papandreou, over the soaring interest rates on government bonds. Elections in 
Italy next year (2013) will reveal the populations' judgment over the austerity measures now 
undertaken by the interim technocrat government. The lesson from these observations is that even if 
economists or politicians have the 'right answer' to the problems, it may not be possible for them to 
implement the remedy.
 6.3.2  Disaster myopia
The wave of legislation we are now seeing aim towards, among other goals, to increase the capital 
buffer of firms such that they will be better able to withstand shocks without defaulting and 
preventing such shocks from spilling over firms' counterparties and/or other sectors in the economy. 
However, in markets with strong competition such buffers make firms less profitable in 'normal' 
times. To remain competitive in such markets, firms must always be on the very edge of 
profitability. Thus, in the rare event of a crash, the most aggressive firms do not have the necessary 
buffer to remain solvent in the downturn. 
A good example of this problem is found in the banking sector, where the rate of default of loans is 
stable while the economy functions 'normally', but rises sharply in the rare event of a crisis. The 
bank would optimally account for this low-probability event by increasing the interest rate in 
normal times to build up a buffer. In a highly competitive banking sector, however, it is tempting for 
firms bitterly fighting for market share to discount the possibility entirely (or simply gamble that it 
will not happen in the near future). If one or more banks undertake such a strategy, they will likely 
be able to price products cheaper than their competitors and gain market share as buyers flock to the 
cheapest alternative. In turn, other banks who were previously more prudent, might consider 
changing their strategy to avoid losing more market share. It is particularly likely that such a 
scenario might unfold, when the 'large shock' occurs very rarely. It becomes a difficult dilemma for 
banks whether to lower their prices and remain competitive at an unsustainable rate or to build the 
necessary buffer, but lose business to lower priced competitors. 
Guttentag and Herring (1984) modeled this dilemma and argued that this sort of "herd behavior" is 
a result of an availability bias, i.e. that agents underestimate the probability of events that have not 
occurred recently. The bias occurs because humans tend to remember more vividly their more 
recent experiences and assign those more weight when making decisions than the experiences of the 
long gone past. Borio et. al. (2001) argues that the problems stem from the problems with assessing 
risk over longer periods of time and the misalignment between incentives and financial stability for 
the individual bank. 
While the constant striving of firms to get an advantage on their competitors and yield the 
maximum return to investors cause them to deliver goods and services to end users at a low cost, it 
also incentivizes them to take on risky projects and employ debt rather than equity to finance 
investments. The price of these activities is sharply increased volatility of returns to the point where 
insolvencies and defaults are highly likely in the event of a negative shock. The result is a 
procyclical force in the economy, because it tends to reward the most adventurous agents when the 
economy is doing well, and punishes both investors and creditors harshly in recessions. The 
conclusion which can be drawn from this is that even if we regulate collateral levels and other risky 
activities, the agents in the economy will still be intrinsically motivated to take positions which 
does not handle unexpected shocks well. Thus it is highly likely that agents will eventually invent 
new products, contracts and entities which allow them circumvent current regulations. It will 
therefore not be sufficient to create policies and regulation which can successfully handle these 
issues today and consider the case closed. On the contrary, economic conditions and financial 
activities must be continuously monitored, and policies and regulation adapted to changing 
practices in order to remain effective.
At the same time, it should be acknowledged that while there is popular and political willingness to 
implement such regulation today, with the consequences of failing regulation right in front of us, it 
is likely to wane over time. Even if regulation is implemented, if there is subsequently a long period 
of steady economic growth, it might eventually appear unnecessary, causing the above mentioned 
forces to successfully lobby for their removal. The dismal prediction is thus that these problems are 
indeed very likely to resurface in the future, even if we solve them today.
 7 Outlook and future reseach
The research by both Geanakoplos and Minsky-Keen provides important insights about how the 
current economic situation and the functioning of the economy in general. Both avenues are so fresh 
that much remains to be done. In the case of Geanakoplos' leverage cycle, it provides important 
insights with respect to price determination within a narrow set of assumptions; thus it will be 
interesting to see how well the theory performs beyond his examples and whether it can be 
incorporated in a meaningful way into a broader model of a modern economy. On the other hand, 
Keen's model of Minsky's theory employs a bird's-eye view, which highlights the problems which 
arises as a result of agents who discount the significance of past experiences heavily, instead 
attributing greater importance to the most recent ones. However, the model makes a number of 
simplifications which abstracts it from reality. Further work here can hopefully improve the model 
to bring it closer to a realistic description of the economy. Both avenues are promising and 
illuminate important problems with respect to the impact financial markets, in their current form, 
have on the economy. Both theories and their models has a long way to go, but that the foundation 
has been laid, paving the way for subsequent research to gain a better understanding of how the 
economy operates and how to best deal with the problems which arise from economic fluctuations.
 8 Concluding remarks
It has been the goal of this thesis to highlight the important connections between financial markets 
and the real economy, which has played an important role in the recent economic calamity which is 
still unfolding in the United States, Europe and around the globe. It is argued that the financial 
dimension of economics constitutes a potentially procyclical and/or destabilizing force which 
incentivizes individuals, firms and nations under specific circumstances to incur a level of debt, 
which appeared sustainable under the tranquil economic conditions that prevailed when it was 
undertaken, but leaves them vulnerable and sensitive to unexpected negative shocks. For individuals 
and firms these incentives are likely to result in the creation of asset price bubbles and subsequent 
collapses. When nations incur excessive debt, the consequences are potentially catastrophic.
Further, it is argued that the existing economic understanding and policy tools, which in the past 
were successful at keeping economic cycles within acceptable bounds, are no longer sufficiently 
effective as a result of developments and innovations in financial markets. Two separate and 
independently developed models have been presented which both show that given the existing 
economic climate, such economic turbulence as we have seen lately are in fact an inherent 
characteristic of the system, as opposed to an anomaly. The consequence is that we cannot discount 
the possibility of similar or worse fluctuations in the future.
To better direct policy, we require a better understanding of the changes which has taken place in 
financial markets in the last century and how it affects economic stability. The economic literature 
has often sought to discover laws to govern economics analogous to the laws of nature, which 
remain constant over time. Admittedly, the basics hold, et ceteri paribus, like Alfred Marshall taught 
us; however, because the overarching goals of macroeconomics depend on a complex and 
constantly evolving set of conditions, it is unlikely that we can create rules and institutions which 
will remain relevant for all time. To remain effective, a regulatory regime must adapt to 
developments and innovations which renders old rules ineffective and thus obsolete.
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 10 Appendix
Table 1: Leverage cycle schedule.
Prices Buyers Demand Supply
0.200 1.000 5.000 0.000
0.250 0.938 3.750 0.063
0.300 0.875 2.917 0.125
0.350 0.813 2.321 0.188
0.400 0.750 1.875 0.250
0.450 0.688 1.528 0.313
0.500 0.625 1.250 0.375
0.550 0.563 1.023 0.438
0.600 0.500 0.833 0.500
0.650 0.438 0.673 0.563
0.677 0.404 0.596 0.596
0.700 0.375 0.536 0.625
0.750 0.313 0.417 0.688
0.800 0.250 0.313 0.750
0.850 0.188 0.221 0.813
0.900 0.125 0.139 0.875
0.950 0.063 0.066 0.938
1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
